

UNDERSTANDING THE LINKS BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME AND  
TERRORISM IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
2007

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| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE   |                             |                                   |   | Form Approved<br>OMB No. 0704-0188                  |   |
|---|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|---|---|
| Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b>   |                             |                                   |   |   |   |
| 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)<br>15-06-2007   |                             | 2. REPORT TYPE<br>Master's Thesis |   | 3. DATES COVERED (From - To)<br>Aug 2006 - Jun 2007 |   |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE<br><br>Understanding the Links Between Organized Crime and Terrorism in Military Operations   |                             |                                   |   | 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER                                 |   |
|   |                             |                                   |   | 5b. GRANT NUMBER                                    |   |
|   |                             |                                   |   | 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER                          |   |
| 6. AUTHOR(S)<br><br>Parker, Ingrid A., Major  |                             |                                   |   | 5d. PROJECT NUMBER                                  |   |
|   |                             |                                   |   | 5e. TASK NUMBER                                     |   |
|   |                             |                                   |   | 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER                                |   |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)<br>U.S. Army Command and General Staff College<br>ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD<br>1 Reynolds Ave.<br>Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352   |                             |                                   |   | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER            |   |
| 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)   |                             |                                   |   | 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)                    |   |
|   |                             |                                   |   | 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)              |   |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT<br><br>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.  |                             |                                   |   |   |   |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES   |                             |                                   |   |   |   |
| 14. ABSTRACT<br>Organized crime is becoming a large-scale business that is conducting global commerce for the trafficking of illegal services and products as well as developing the associated supply chains. Criminal organizations are conducting commerce across traditional nation-state boundaries allowing criminal groups to work in coordination with other like groups; this coordination is called transnational crime. The United Nations (UN), aware of this activity, has stated that "the traditional hierarchical forms of organized crime groups have diminished; replaced with loose networks who work together to exploit new" markets of opportunity (UNODC 2006d, paragraph 2). These loose networks have many resources available to affiliates that include financial services, global transportation, and the weapons industry. Criminals, organized crime, and terrorist networks have access to these valuable resources via this affiliation. Organized crime, consequently, may be used as a tool of war. |                             |                                   |   |   |   |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS   |                             |                                   |   |   |   |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:<br>UNCLASSIFIED   |                             |                                   | 17. LIMITATION<br>OF ABSTRACT<br><br>UU | 18. NUMBER<br>OF PAGES<br><br>110                   | 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON           |
| a. REPORT<br>Unclassified   | b. ABSTRACT<br>Unclassified | c. THIS PAGE<br>Unclassified      |   |   | 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) |

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

Organized crime is becoming a large-scale business that is conducting global commerce for the trafficking of illegal services and products as well as developing the associated supply chains. Criminal organizations are conducting commerce across traditional nation-state boundaries allowing criminal groups to work in coordination with other like groups; this coordination is called transnational crime. The United Nations (UN), aware of this activity, has stated that “the traditional hierarchical forms of organized crime groups have diminished; replaced with loose networks who work together to exploit new” markets of opportunity (UNODC 2006d, paragraph 2). These loose networks have many resources available to affiliates that include financial services, global transportation, and the weapons industry. Criminals, organized crime, and terrorist networks have access to these valuable resources via this affiliation. Currently:

1. Illegal drugs make up 8 percent of the world trade or \$322 billion (Drug Policy Alliance 2004, paragraph 4)
2. Global prostitution industry is estimated to be \$52 billion (Hughes 2000, paragraph 16)
3. Worldwide money laundering activity is at roughly \$1 trillion a year (Ashcroft 2001, paragraph 4)
4. Weapons smuggling is a multi-billion dollar industry (UNODC 2006d, paragraph 3)

Organized crime, consequently, may be used as a tool of war.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Colonel Christopher T. Mayer, Chief of Staff Defense Reconstruction Support Office, the Pentagon

Lieutenant Colonel John Altman, IOC, United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)

Lieutenant Colonel Marco Lovell (ret), Senior Training and Doctrine Advisor to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Minister of Defense

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ..... | ii   |
| ABSTRACT .....  | iii  |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....   | iv   |
| ACRONYMS .....  | vii  |
| ILLUSTRATIONS .....   | ix   |
| TABLES .....  | x    |
| CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .....                                 | 1    |
| Thesis .....  | 1    |
| CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW .....                            | 5    |
| Army Doctrine FM 3-24, dated June 2006 .....                  | 5    |
| Theoretical Review .....                                      | 7    |
| Theory of Anomie .....  | 9    |
| Conflict Theory .....   | 10   |
| Differential Opportunity Theory .....                         | 11   |
| Repressive Regime Theory .....                                | 11   |
| CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY .....                                  | 21   |
| CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES .....                                 | 24   |
| Case Study: Colombia .....                                    | 24   |
| Case Study: Afghanistan .....                                 | 33   |
| Case Study: Algeria .....                                     | 52   |
| Case Study: Iraq .....  | 63   |
| CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....              | 71   |
| What will this Threat Look Like? .....                        | 71   |
| Characteristics of a Nexus .....                              | 73   |
| Role for the U.S. Military .....                              | 78   |
| Understanding the Landscape .....                             | 79   |
| Analysis and Recommendations .....                            | 81   |

|  |    |
|--|----|
| APPENDIX A ABU GHRAIB WEAPON PHOTOS .....                        | 85 |
| APPENDIX B NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 221 ..... | 86 |
| APPENDIX C COMMUNICATION VIA TATTOOS .....                       | 89 |
| APPENDIX D TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONAL CATEGORIES .....             | 90 |
| REFERENCE LIST .....   | 91 |
| DISTRIBUTION LIST .....  | 98 |
| CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT .....              | 99 |

## ACRONYMS

|          |  |
|----------|--|
| ALN      | National Liberation Army                   |
| ANA      | Afghan National Army                       |
| ANAPO    | National Popular Alliance                  |
| ANP      | Afghan National Police                     |
| AT/FP    | Antiterrorism/Force Protection             |
| AUC      | United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia     |
| CIA      | Central Intelligence Agency                |
| COE      | Contemporary Operational Environment       |
| CRS      | Congressional Research Service             |
| DOD      | Department of Defense                      |
| DOS      | Department of State                        |
| ELN      | National Liberation Army                   |
| FARC     | Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia     |
| FBI      | Federal Bureau of Investigations           |
| FLN      | National Liberation Front                  |
| FM       | Field Manual                               |
| GOI      | Government of Iraq                         |
| GSM      | Global System for Mobile communications    |
| INTERPOL | International Criminal Police Organization |
| IPF      | Iraqi Police Forces                        |
| IRA      | Irish Republican Army                      |
| KGB      | Committee for State Security               |
| MIA      | Marxist Internet Archive                   |



|        |   |
|--------|---|
| MIPT   | Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism  |
| NATO   | North Atlantic Treaty Organization                  |
| NSDD   | National Security Decision Directive                |
| OGD    | Publications of the Geopolitical Drug Watch         |
| PGIS   | Pinkerton Corporation's Global Intelligence Service |
| SIM    | Subscriber Identity Module                          |
| TKB    | Terrorism Knowledge Base                            |
| TTP    | Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures                 |
| U.S.C. | United States Code                                  |
| UK     | United Kingdom                                      |
| UN     | United Nations                                      |
| UNODC  | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime            |
| USE-I  | United States Embassy, Iraq                         |
| USG    | United States Government                            |
| WW     | World War   |

## ILLUSTRATIONS

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| Figure 1. Colombia, coca cultivation (ha) 1990 – 2005 .....                   | 28   |
| Figure 2. Focus of FARC Attacks by Target.....                                | 33   |
| Figure 3. Afghanistan, Opium production, 1990 to 2005 .....                   | 39   |
| Figure 4. Conceptual Design of in Organized Crime in the Western Balkans..... | 74   |
| Figure 5. Characteristics of High-Level Nexus.....                            | 74   |
| Figure 6. Characteristics of Low-level Nexus.....                             | 77   |
| Figure 7. Data Reduction.....   | 83   |
| Figure 8. Shanks and Electrical Shock Devices .....                           | 85   |
| Figure 9. Sling Shots and Strangulation Devices .....                         | 85   |

## TABLES

|  | Page |
|--|------|
| Table 1. High Degree of Repression.....                        | 17   |
| Table 2. Moderate to High Degree of Repression .....           | 17   |
| Table 3. Colombia and Afghanistan Comparison.....              | 51   |
| Table 4. Algeria Troop Strength 1954-57 .....                  | 54   |
| Table 5. FLN Restrictions.....                                 | 63   |
| Table 6. Estimates of Iraqi Civilians Killed by Violence ..... | 64   |
| Table 7. Iraqis Kidnapped.....                                 | 64   |
| Table 8. Algeria and Iraq Comparison.....                      | 69   |

# CHAPTER 1.

## INTRODUCTION

### Thesis

On today's battlefield, organized crime is emerging as larger threat due to adaptation in the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). This thesis will address how this threat has adapted and evolved on the battlefield, particularly as it relates to the issues of crime and terrorism in the COE. The primary research question for this thesis is, therefore, "Is there a relationship between organized crime and terrorism?" To answer this question, there are a number of secondary questions that must be answered. These include: (1) Do criminal networks work in coordination with terrorist networks?; (2) How will transnational crime affect military operations?; (3) How is crime employed on the battlefield?; (4) What might this threat look like in terms of organization, money, structure, motives, and affiliations?; and (5) What are the points of convergence between criminal and terrorist networks?

First, this study will cover modern examples of criminal activity or criminal organizations linked to insurgent or terrorist groups. The Algerian, Colombian, Iraq, and Afghanistan insurgencies are most representative of the criminal and terrorist links one can expect to see in the future operational environment. These insurgencies, therefore, have the most implications for future military operations as well as an understanding of a criminal and terrorist nexus.

Second, this study will investigate insurgencies after World War II (WW II) as "the world economy embarked on a long run of intensifying international trade and investment that restarted globalization" (Horowitz 2004, 127). Globalization had stalled

due to “the depression, the international trade and financial agreements, and the protectionisms that were in place in the major economies” (Horowitz 2004, 127). Armed with American technology, globalization thrived after WW II creating an interconnectedness that spurred an unprecedented growth in certain countries and left others countries behind. In order to maintain this level of growth, new processes and technologies had to be improved leading to larger financial systems, improved trade agreements, investment and finally the Internet. This growth spread as the U.S. military and private businesses sought to rebuild and stabilize Germany, Japan, and Korea.

Why would terrorists establish links with criminal organizations? First of all, crime and terrorism are somewhat related in definition and tactical application; however, historically these organizations have differing modus operandi, motivations, and ideologies. Crime is usually motivated by financial gain; whereas terrorism has been primarily motivated by ideology, like Maoism, Marxism, or theological ideologies. In March 2006, John R. Wagley wrote in the CRS Report for Congress that “terrorists are increasingly seen as supporting themselves through criminal activity, because a growing number of extremists may feel justified in committing the criminal activities themselves, on the grounds that such acts square with their ultimate terrorist aims” (Wagley 2006, 2). For example, “funding for the March 2003 Madrid train attacks came from drug dealing and the Dubai-based Indian mobster, Aftab Ansari, is believed to have helped fund the September 11 attacks with ransom money earned from kidnapping” (Wagley 2006, 3).

In areas such as parts of Africa, Central Asia, and the Balkans, and in specific countries such as Afghanistan, Burma, and Colombia, the traditional distinctions between politically motivated organizations and those seeking financial gain have become blurred amid a complex mixture of insurgency, factionalism, warlordism,

terrorism, crime and corruption that is extremely difficult to disentangle, let alone manage. (Garces 2005, 87)

For the criminal, establishing a relationship with a terrorist or insurgent group gives an air of legitimacy to the criminal organization while the insurgent or terrorist receives goods, services, and revenue from participation in criminal activities. The revenues keep the insurgent's cause alive and well, while the criminal networks are supplied with men, resources, and monies; thus the symbiotic relationship is maintained. Another benefit of this relationship is proven techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP) against law enforcement, the government, and social institutions in a particular country. These TTP are invaluable as criminals can teach insurgents or terrorists (1) the weaknesses of the country's rule of law; (2) how to operate without detection - under the radar; (3) the least detectable communication methods - cell phone burners, Morse code, child messengers, encrypted websites like Hushmail, or letters with simple encryption; and (4) how to use already well-developed criminal supply trains - like arms dealers, the narcotics trade, and money laundering services.

The phenomenon of globalization and the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center have created the conditions for the linkages between organized crime and terrorism to grow on a broader scale. This trend is growing due to:

1. The U.S. governmental crackdown on insurgent funding in which "153 individuals, organizations, and financial supporters of terrorism" access to financial networks were severely reduced or eliminated by the 29-nation Financial Action Task Force (Bush 2001, paragraph 24-31)
2. The need to create revenue
3. The use of well-developed criminal supply chains and networks
4. The symbiotic relationship that criminals and terrorists share

Chapter 1 introduced the thesis of this paper and chapter 2 will review crime and terrorism literature and its theoretical application.

## CHAPTER 2.

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Army Doctrine FM 3-24, dated June 2006

Considering the impact of globalization on criminal organizations, one viewpoint holds that the blending of an insurgency with crime may fuel an organization and resource it to achieve larger and more grandiose tactical successes. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, discusses the blending of insurgency and crime in the terms of degeneration. Currently, Army doctrine minimizes the impact of this nexus and has determined that it means the insurgency is in the disintegration phase. This was mostly true prior to 9/11; however, with international communities reducing or eliminating the insurgents and terrorists access to mainstream financial institutions; these old truisms are changing.

Throughout history there has been no shortage of insurgencies that have degenerated to criminality. This often occurred as the primary movements disintegrated and remaining elements were cast adrift. Doctrinal thinking has long held that such disintegration is desirable because it takes a truly dangerous ideologically inspired body of disaffiliated individuals and replaces it with a less dangerous but more diverse body, normally of very uneven character. (FM 3-24 2006, 1-9)

In order to understand crime and terrorism, one must understand the context in which analytical and law enforcement agencies define terms. The FBI “defines organized crime as any group having some manner of a formalized structure and whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities” (FBI 2006, paragraph 2). These activities include:

Bribery  
Counterfeiting  
Mail Fraud

Murder  
Embezzlement of Union Funds  
Wire Fraud



|                         |   |
|-------------------------|---|
| Money Laundering        | Obstruction of Justice                    |
| Murder for Hire         | Drug Trafficking                          |
| Prostitution            | Sexual Exploitation of Children           |
| Alien Smuggling         | Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods          |
| Kidnapping              | Gambling                                  |
| Arson                   | Robbery                                   |
| Sports Bribery          | Extortion                                 |
| Drugs                   | Theft from Interstate Shipment/Interstate |
| (FBI 2006, paragraph 3) |   |

Now compare the FBI definition of organized crime to the several national and international definitions of terrorism . These definitions allow an institution to study, track, or bring charges on terrorist organizations. The definitions are:

The U.S. Department of State (DOS) defines terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. (U.S. DOS 2003, xiii)

Under the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. (Jarboe 2002, paragraph 3)

The Department of Defense (DOD) defines the calculated use, or threatened use, of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. (FM 1-02 2004, 1-186)

The UN defines terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed; terrorism are criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them. (UNODC 2006c, paragraph 6)

The Patriot Act defines terrorism as activities that (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the U.S. or of any state, that (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. (18 U.S.C. 2331 2006, 3)

The Pinkerton Corporation's Global Intelligence Service (PGIS) defines terrorism as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation. (PGIS 2003, 30)

RAND Corporation defines terrorism by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators nor the nature of the cause. Terrorism is violence, the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions they would otherwise not undertake or refrain from taking actions that they desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. (LaFree et al 2006, 29)

The FBI definition of organized crime does not correspond to the myriad of definition of terrorism; however, the activities of organized crime match-up with the acts of terrorism, in that terrorism uses violent acts to achieve a particular goal. Hamm describes several crimes used by the Irish Republic Army (IRA) to fund the insurgency; these included "smuggling livestock, cars, weapons; running protection and extortion rackets; managing underground brothels; orchestrating prison breaks; bank robbery, tax evasion and construction fraud" (Hamm 2005, 5).

### Theoretical Review

Terrorism usually results from multiple causal factors - not only psychological but also economic, political, religious, and sociological factors, among others. There is even an hypothesis that it is caused by physiological factors. Because terrorism is a multi-causal phenomenon, it would be simplistic and erroneous to explain an act of terrorism by a single cause, such as the psychological need of the terrorist to perpetrate an act of violence. (Hudson 1999, 15)

Crime and terrorism have occurred under various conditions and as stated above are multi-causal phenomenon. Several theories are more relevant when understanding the criminogenic or terrorist trends; these are the theories of Anomie, Repressive Regime, Conflict, and Differential Opportunity. Each explains elements of the crime and terrorism phenomenon even though they are intermixed and overlapping when evaluating a

particular trend. Both crime and terrorism have occurred under similar conditions. These conditions include economic hardship, social stratification, repressive regimes, weak or limited law enforcement, socioeconomics, and the politics of a particular region. Both crime and terrorism enable the disenfranchised or the subjugated to gain life success by choosing another path that breaks the institutional barriers of entry using innovative, illegal methods. These methods provide opportunities for ideological wins, financial gain and vertical movement in a society; consequently, the sociopolitical and socioeconomic environment can actually empower criminal and terrorist elements. Other factors like high unemployment, poverty, the lack of education, the lack of opportunities, high infant mortality rates, and cultural/religious relations; all contribute to criminal and terrorist trends.

Given ripe economic, environmental, and international factors, transnational crime is growing. One of the most lucrative attractions to transnational crime has been the global marketplace as well as international instability. Consequently, crime has changed; it has become a nexus of organizations – based on products, services, supply chains, and revenues. The United Nations (UN) has stated that “the traditional hierarchical forms of organized crime groups have diminished; replaced with loose networks who work together in order to exploit new market opportunities” (UNODC 2006d, paragraph 2). Shelley stated in 1997 “international organized crime groups are the reverse of legitimate multi-national corporations; most major multi-national corporations are based in the industrialized world and market to the developing world, whereas transnational organized crime groups are largely based in developing countries and market to the developed world” (Shelley 1997, paragraph 10). Given their location, these

organizations can be immensely profitable, well-organized, and difficult to detect as they are an illegitimate joint venture of sorts. Like organized crime, terrorism is growing with international instability and globalization. The growth in terrorism has been occurring in the same manner as organized crime to include recruiting, increased innovation, creative financing, and increased opportunities.

A method to study and understand criminal behaviors has been criminology, which uses sociology and statistics in order to scientifically analyze criminogenic trends. The same theories can be used to study terrorism to develop trend analysis, identify patterns of vulnerable societies, and develop combative or social mechanisms to curb escalation.

### Theory of Anomie

Anomie is a condition in society that affects human behavior drastically; it is period that is characterized by social and moral disorder. Robert Merton, a criminologist, defined Anomie as “the form that societal incoherence that takes place when there is a significant detachment between valued cultural ends and legitimate societal means to those ends” (Akers 2000, 143-161). Thus, Anomie is caused when a culture makes incompatible demands to succeed, fails to establish equal access of attainment, and is unable to regulate the conduct of the people in the society (Rock 2002). Anomie results in the breakdown of a society or “the socially-fostered state of discontent and deregulation that generates crime and deviance as part of a routinely functioning society” (Rock 2002, 53). These societal stressors cause an increase in deviance which in turn creates additional pressures to commit crimes within a particular group or class. These classes or groups produce new norms because the social and moral bonds have been loosened

enough to create an accepted disorder. Consequently, Anomie describes an individual's detachment or alienation from mainstream society, because of the changing roles in a community, the family, or the social construct.

### Conflict Theory

Conflict Theory conjectures that inequality is caused by “the perpetual struggle for power and authority whether political and economic, or corporate and bureaucratic” (Coser et al 1893, 17). Conflict Theory states that all social systems maintain an unequal distribution of wealth, power, and prestige; this unequal distribution affects people's upward mobility and their life opportunities. Conflict Theorist, Karl Marx, believed that stratification caused inequality in a society because some members in a society owned the means of production while others do not (Coser et al. 1893). Consequently, the upper strata or the wealthy have the most advantages while the lower classes have the least advantages.

Conflict Theory, as related to criminology, relates crime as a necessary function of a society. This occurs due the perpetual struggle which forces segments of a society to attain power and authority in other roles or industries that are not wholly-accepted by the society. For example, the victimless crimes like prostitution, drugs, or gambling; these crimes are often based-on a society's moral definitions, even though many of the crimes are perpetrated by law-abiding members of the society. Conflict Theory also describes the allure of a criminogenic community, because it offers another method to achieve upward mobility or life success.

### Differential Opportunity Theory

The Differential Opportunity Theory regards the absence of legitimate opportunities as the cause of crime. This theory is a “combination of Strain, Differential Association and Social Disorganization theories” (Cloward and Ohlin 1959, paragraph 2). Differential opportunities are alternatives to the societal normative jobs and create other illegal opportunities to achieve success. These opportunities can include organized crime and terrorism.

Cloward and Ohlin (1960) stated that “the first the criminal gang emerged in the lower-classes and in areas where conventional as well as non-conventional values of behavior were integrated by a close connection between legitimate and illegitimate businesses. Thus, the criminal gang emerged in reaction to the limited opportunities in either business sector. The group structure provided the parent-like role model to young gang members while offering leadership, training and mentorship. The hierarchical structure created stability and continuity within the gang; thus enabling it to overcome the barriers to entry in the illegitimate sector of business (Cloward and Ohlin 1959). This is an important factor in criminal and terrorist recruiting because it provides members alternatives in the societal construct and enables win-win scenarios to achieve theological, ideological, or monetary success, especially using the criminal gang concept.

### Repressive Regime Theory

The Repressive Regime Theory has not been formally written; however, many theorists are noticing that the rise in terrorism and crime occur under repressive regimes. Repressive regimes have several common characteristics in the management of state crime. First, the state uses fear tactics to curb criminal behavior; this includes abductions,

disappearances, or social silence. The state's harsh handling of criminals creates a very brutal criminal culture as getting caught can mean death or disappearance. Second, criminals work very-well under the radar of law enforcement. Third, it creates a criminal culture that works outside of the law, but within the umbrella of the institution; it uses all of the states' flaws to conduct the business of crime including corruption, political pawns, blackmail, and bribery. Most importantly, organizations in repressive regimes are thriving under globalization. Criminal and terrorists networks are thought to be one of the biggest beneficiaries of globalization because the monies gained by these global networks are untaxed which has created the "travel, trade and telecommunications networks to facilitate business operations" (Shelley 1997, paragraph 7).

In a repressive regimes, there is a hardened criminal underclass and terrorist groups; both are the result of the "ubiquity of violence that is endured and inflicted" in repressive regimes (McDougall 2005, 118). Both groups "operate under the radar of the governing party with support from clan, family, ethnic, and religious groups and use the corruption in the ruling class to facilitate operations.

There are common characteristics of insurgencies falling under the Repressive Regime Theory. Many have to do with the formation of government and the degree to which a nation's people are empowered. The lack of empowerment occurs in many forms of government to include democracy, monarchism, communism, socialism, or totalitarianism. Insurgencies of this type occur in different governmental models as most governments do not fully develop the ideological theories behind them. The following list is common characteristics of the repressive regime phenomenon:

1. These societies have a one or two party system with one dominating party.

2. These societies lack self-governance; most of the population has little to no representation in government.
3. These societies have voting prohibitions by ethnic groups, women, or certain members of a society.
4. Since the law enforcement may be ineffective or weak in these regimes, the social order may be maintained by a social or religious institution that works in place of rule of law.
5. These societies are highly stratified; consequently there is a small or no middle class.
6. There is little assimilation into the mainstream ideology whether democracy, monarchism, communism, socialism, or totalitarianism. These regimes allow the populace to maintain clan, family, ethnic, and religious ties.
7. Repressive regimes use high-levels of violence to control the populace; thus pacification is generally very violent.
8. The government is controlled by ruling elite with high-levels of corruption. Common practices in these regimes are appointments vice elections; partisanship; one main political party; and acts of bribery and corruption.
9. Nationalistic sentiments, the desire to establish self-rule for a group of culturally or ethnically similar people bound by a geographic area, is met with suppressive military, police, or governmental action in repressive regimes. These actions have included limited/unlimited war, purges, genocide, incarceration, or other repressive governmental measures.
10. Repressive regimes suppressed the rise of self representation, while other unifying factors remained in lieu of one national identity:
  - (a) Clans and family remained the unifying factor across national boundaries.
  - (b) Religion became a unifying factor across national boundaries.
  - (c) Ethnicity became a unifying factor across national boundaries. Ethnically similar groups are people of the same ancestry, history, religion and culture.
  - (d) Historical borders of ethnic groups remained a contentious factor.
  - (e) Historical conflicts between ethnic groups remained unresolved, only suppressed under the repressive regime.



(f) Culturally similar groups are people with related customs, courtesies, values and social norms to include “religion and language, the arts, and the ways in which social and economic status are gained.” (People and Culture 2007, paragraph 1)

One type of country that remains vulnerable to insurgency using the Repressive Regime Theory is a country that was colonized during imperialism. In many cases, the mother-country did not emplace a system of governance that allowed the greater society a participative involvement in governance; thus the consequences of colonization were insurgency, war, or weak governance. After WW II, the small war trend heightened as did the continuation of repressive regimes. In most situations the indigenous people had little or no power due to racism, a perceived inadequacy, lack of resources, or another country’s hegemony. The wars, remembered as small wars, were due to the rise of nationalism in Europe in the early 20th century; the refusal to allow self-rule; frail governments in the European colonies; and the military overmatch of the mother-country to its colony.

Some insurgencies in repressive regimes intentionally created conditions for inter-group rivalry. This rivalry included ethnic, religious, cultural, or gender group tension. These conditions generally allowed for certain crimes on the under-empowered of a society which facilitated the insurgent group’s goal.

Insurgencies that develop out of repressive regime model conduct large-scale influence operations. Influence operations are the “ability to develop systematic informational approaches with central control and functional leadership; its ability to integrate technological innovations within the organization with a dedicated dissemination structure” (Ward 2002, 2). Insurgent groups using terrorist tactics and large-scale influence operations most commonly have a theological or socialist ideology.

A theological ideology can work in place of the nationalistic identity, transcend borders, or other identity factors. These identity factors can include tribe affiliation, religion, ancestry, or ideology. These countries have groups of disenfranchised societal members who do not have the societal bonds to remain within the rules of the nation or society. These types of countries have high unemployment rates, little opportunity for marriage, little education, and few legitimate opportunities for monetary success.

Repressive regime insurgencies maximize recruiting using the theoretical methods of Conflict, Differential Opportunity, and the Theory of Anomie to lure new insurgents, terrorists, or supporters. Since many of these societies are highly stratified, the insurgent groups have a good pool of available workers. Certain insurgencies use social conditioning to maintain a pool of workers or insurgents like the Taliban or the National Liberation Front (FLN). The insurgents are very similar to criminal gangs that Cloward and Ohlin observed.

The populations residing in repressive regimes are changing due to globalization and the information age. Globalization is an awakening factor and can disrupt the repressive regime's pacification methods. The insurgent groups or revolutionary movements in these types of countries understand the power structure within their society; whether the power is held by the population, ethnic groups, political parties or a leader. The insurgent group adopts the best strategy and the supporting tactics to achieve governmental change based-on the time and resources available to the group.

Insurgencies that develop due to repressive regimes have an anti-west sentiment. This sentiment has been imbedded in many countries due to nineteenth century European imperialism; American big business practices around the globe; Christianity's

ethnocentric tendencies; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities abroad; and the U.S. Government's bully or uni-polar world status. At the same time, Islam presents an alternative to the western paradigm of religion and governance in the way that crime does in both Differential Opportunity and the Conflict theories. These theories describe the opportunities for success in illegitimate businesses when barriers to entry exist in legitimate businesses. The Islamic alternative of religion and governance is growing due the spread of Islam, higher birth-rates in Islamic countries, and the western dominance and arrogance in world affairs.

Tables 1 and 2 are excerpts from Freedom House report, *The Worst of the Worst of the World's Most Repressive Societies 2007*, to the UN; "it focuses on countries that have seen some of the world's most severe repression and most systematic and brutal violations of human dignity" (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 5). Currently there are 44 countries categorized as repressive regimes; these nations pose a threat to world security as they may be involved in a future conflict due to the repressive nature of the government, the socioeconomic environment, and transnational crime. Table 1 lists the countries from the Freedom House report that represents nations with the least amount of political rights or civil liberties for its' population. These countries were categorized as 6 and 7 on Freedom House scale.

The charts are based-on a survey that rates each country and territory on a seven-point scale for both political rights and civil liberties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free, and then assigns each country and territory a broad category status of Free. Those countries and territories which received scores of 6 for political rights and 7 for civil liberties, 7 for political rights and 6 for civil liberties, and 7 for both political rights and civil liberties are included in the group of "the worst of the worst." Within these groups are gradations of freedom that make some more repressive than others. (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 144)

| Table 1. High Degree of Repression |              |              |
|------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Belarus                            | Laos         | Syria        |
| Burma                              | Libya        | Turkmenistan |
| China                              | North Korea  | Uzbekistan   |
| Cote d'Ivoire                      | Saudi Arabia | Vietnam      |
| Cuba                               | Somalia      | Zimbabwe     |
| Equatorial Guinea                  | Sudan        |              |
| Eritrea                            | Swaziland    |              |

Source: Eiss, Piano, and Puddington, *The Worst of the Worst the World's Most Repressive Societies 2007* (New York: Freedom House, 2007), 136-142.

Table 2 represents countries with some political rights and civil liberties, but is still categorized as “not free” by the Freedom House report (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 136-142). These countries were categorized as 5 and 6 on Freedom House scale.

| Table 2. Moderate to High Degree of Repression |            |                      |
|--|------------|----------------------|
| Angola   | Egypt      | Qatar                |
| Azerbaijan                                     | Guinea     | Russia               |
| Bhutan   | Iran       | Rwanda               |
| Brunei   | Iraq       | Tajikistan           |
| Cambodia                                       | Kazakhstan | Thailand             |
| Cameroon                                       | Kyrgyzstan | Tunisia              |
| Chad   | Maldives   | United Arab Emirates |
| Congo (Brazzaville)                            | Oman       |                      |
| Congo (Kinshasa)                               | Pakistan   |                      |

Source: Eiss, Piano, and Puddington, *The Worst of the Worst the World's Most Repressive Societies 2007* (New York: Freedom House, 2007), 136-142.

The links between repressive regimes and organized crime are difficult to measure. However, there are trends, especially in the activities of organized crime that can be noted. For example, “organized crime groups dealing in wildlife include Colombian drug cartels, Chinese Triad groups, the Red Mafia from the former Soviet Union who use violence to control the illegal trade” (Environment News Service 2002 5). Additionally, organized crime is occurring in the European Union with the surge of illicit immigration with shifting inbound routes (Brothers 2007, paragraph 3). The monies are so in large in fact, that “organized crime is largely to blame for the six-fold increase last year in illegal migration from African shores to the Canary Islands of Spain” (Bothers 2007, paragraph 6).

*The Worst of the Worst the World’s Most Repressive Societies 2007* by Freedom House cited some of the activities in repressive regimes. Many include activities that are traditionally conducted by organized crime syndicates; although in many instance are conducted by state. Others are black market activities facilitated by governmental corruption. The following list illustrates activities in several of the repressive regimes:

#### Burma

1. In September, the UN Security Council added Burma to its permanent agenda, with many members arguing that internal repression and the flourishing drug trade made the country a threat to international security (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 16).
2. In addition, they are regularly subjected to arbitrary taxation and other forms of extortion, as well as forced eviction and land confiscation, at the hands of Burmese security forces (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 20).

#### Chechnya

1. Akhmad Kadyrov’s Special Purpose Regiment in 2004 are reportedly involved in abductions, disappearances, extortion, trading in contraband, and the

maintenance of unsanctioned prisons and torture chambers (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 132).

2. The Chechen police forces are led by commanders who have allegedly committed murder and abductions (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 134).

3. Extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and other serious crimes are rarely investigated and even more rarely prosecuted (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 135).

4. Widespread corruption and the economic devastation caused by the war severely limit equality of opportunity. Ransom obtained from kidnapping and the lucrative illegal oil trade provide money for Chechens and members of the Russian military (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 135).

### China

1. The one-child policy and cultural preference for boys over girls, including sex-selective abortion, has led to a shortage of females, creating a market for human trafficking (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 28).

### Cote d'Ivoire

1. Profits from cocoa, cotton, and weapons, as well as informal taxes, have made resolving the Ivorian conflict a less attractive option for many in power, including members of the military and rebel forces (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 32).

2. Child labor and child trafficking are problems in Cote d'Ivoire (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 35).

### Equatorial Guinea

1. Maintains a security agreement with Sao Tome and Principe aimed at guaranteeing the safety of offshore oil rigs, as well as controlling clandestine immigration and drug trafficking, and guaranteeing the security of maritime and air traffic.

### Laos

1. The rural peoples of Laos rely heavily on the illegal growth and sale of opium poppy for their economic livelihood (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 53).

### Turkmenistan

1. Remains a smuggling corridor for drugs from neighboring Afghanistan, with numerous reports suggesting the involvement of high-level officials in the narcotics trade and a growing problem of drug addiction within Turkmenistan.

### Saudi Arabia

1. Money laundering and charitable contributions are made in Saudi Arabia that can be directly linked to terrorist groups; The Saudi government has taken steps to stem the flow of financial support to terrorist groups (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 65).

### Sudan

1. The government had bombed and destroyed civilian targets, denied humanitarian relief to rebel-held areas and internally displaced people, and forced conversions to Islam (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 77).

### Zimbabwe

1. Crimes committed during the election campaign, including assault, arson, forced evictions, kidnapping, torture, rape, and attempted murder by the ZANU-PF were pardoned (Eiss, Piano, and Puddington 2007, 108).

Chapter 2 discussed the literature review of crime and terrorism and chapter 3 will address the research methodology.

## CHAPTER 3.

### METHODOLOGY

This research paper will use the case study methodology, a qualitative comparison, and statistical analysis of data to determine linkages between organized crime and terrorism. The case study method is a collection and presentation of information about a several insurgencies; it is a form of qualitative, descriptive research. Within the case study, I will evaluate trends and other phenomena while drawing conclusions on the two levels, a high and a low crime/terrorism nexus. The comparison between insurgencies will also be used to identify similarities and differences through the use of secondary research. Finally, the last method used is descriptive analysis of statistics. The researcher will use these techniques to confirm or deny the findings in the case studies and the comparison as well as determine a degree of relevance. Together, this methodology will allow me to make recommendations for intelligence techniques that could be used against these types of threats as well determine new adaptations in the COE.

In order to analyze this information, the researcher will lay out some facts and assumptions to limit the scope the study. These assumptions are “judgments concerning unknown factors and the future which are made in analyzing alternative courses of action; they are used to support and reasonably limit the scope of the analysis”

(Department of Health and Human Services 2007, 1).

#### Facts

1. Violent and nonviolent methods are the traditional techniques insurgents have used to force governmental change.



2. Terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare are violent tactics within an insurgency to achieve governmental change.
3. The nonviolent forms of insurgency represents movements like Gandhi's movement in India and the demonstrations of Hungary during communist rule. Nonviolent movements use strikes, boycotts, peaceful demonstrations, media and international/popular support to achieve governmental change. A nonviolent movement can be the precursor to a violent movement.
4. Insurgents and terrorists develop patterns that can be exploited.
5. Insurgents and a terrorists use doctrine and strategy to develop the nature of war.

### Assumptions

1. An insurgent and a terrorist are similar in that an insurgent may use terrorist tactics in conduct of the war. Insurgency, as defined by O'Neill's *Insurgency and Terrorism*, is "a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources or violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics" (O'Neill 2005, 15). An insurgent is a person who "attempts to overthrow or subvert an established government or authority" using violent or nonviolent methods (FM 3-24, 1-1); whereas a terrorist is "one who threatens to use or uses physical coercion, primarily against noncombatants, especially civilians, to create fear in order to achieve various political objectives" (O'Neill 2005, 33).
2. The adaptive nature of insurgency requires that insurgents are changing patterns and are open to new methods. In order to achieve desired result, an insurgent group can adopt different strategic approach based-on resources and available time required to bring about governmental change. These strategies are based-on the "relative importance of environment, popular support, organization, unity, external support, and governmental response" (O'Neill 2005, 13).
3. Transnational crime poses an additional threat to the paradigm of violent and nonviolent insurgencies as it can force change through governmental corruption which can be undetectable or obscured from view by legitimate governments. These insurgencies could use "commercialistic, traditionalist, or apocalyptic-utopian" ideology to gain support while resourced by the growth of illegal commerce in globalization (O'Neill 2005, 20).
4. The "underlying assumption is simply this: All terrorism involves criminal activity; these criminal activities can range from such highly sophisticated affairs as building bombs and coordinating terrorist cells, to such common events as walking through airport security and driving motor vehicles" (Hamm 2005, 29).

The FBI definition of organized crime does not exactly match the definition of terrorism; however, the activities of organized crime do.

5. Organized crime, traditional or transnational, is the key indicator in a crime and terrorist nexus.

Chapter 3 discussed the research methodology while chapter 4 uses the case study template to draw comparisons on organized crime and terrorism.

## CHAPTER 4.

### CASE STUDIES

#### Case Study: Colombia

In investigating a relationship between organized crime and terrorism, one must look to the country of Colombia as Colombia has a history of a frail government, economic instability, an insurgency, and rampant crime. According to the World Factbook, the Colombian government has been fighting “a 40-year conflict with anti-government insurgent groups and illegal paramilitary groups - both heavily funded by the drug trade” (CIA 2007b, paragraph 1).

Transnational organized crime as a global phenomenon has been the subject of much attention lately, especially regarding drug trafficking. This is due to a trend toward violence and terrorism, particularly in Colombia, a trend that has been fueled by the wealth and power that the illicit drug industry has been able to generate. (Bibes 2001, 243)

Colombia can be defined by its rigid geography as well as a very diverse population. Colombia was born out of colonialism in 1830 and was formed from the large colony, Gran Colombia (CIA 2007b). Colombia has a diverse population with over 58 percent of the population being of mixed descent of Spanish, African, indigenous, and Caucasian peoples. Over 75 percent of the Colombian population live in urban centers due to the economic hardships in the remote areas as well as the active volcanoes and cold mountain plateaus in the west. The population is only homogenous in their religious beliefs – Catholicism. Catholicism is present in all aspects of life to include, the Colombian home, the school system, the work environment, and the social order. The church’s influence affects the people’s choice for political party membership, social organizations, and personal, professional, and business affiliations.

Colombia's people do not have a strong nationalistic attitude; although they have strong political party allegiances. Colombia's people are individualistic vice group-oriented as Catholicism has been a strong influence in the region. Men and women have traditional roles in the family and most are family-oriented. The country has a 92.4 percent literacy rate even though 49.2 percent live below the poverty level (CIA 2007b).

The socio-political factors that contributed to the 40-year insurgency were a corrupt government system led by individuals who focused on self-interest vice the governmental reforms. These politicians furthered their positions by gaining influence in the church; consequently the church was divided into two factions - centralists and federalists. These two ideologies developed into two polarized groups, the conservatives or centralists and the liberals or federalists. Another factor that influenced the insurgency was an illiterate population; therefore the population supported the political group that the local church supported. This early polarization created intense regional, factional, and personal disputes for more than 50 armed conflicts between the political parties during the 20th century.

The Colombia insurgency evolved over 30-40 years, starting around 1970; however, the early signs of discontent appeared in the 1940s and 1950s. The guerilla movement in Colombia was coined narco-terrorism in the 1980s as it combined the traditional revolutionary movements and the drug trafficking industry. Together these organizations presented "a serious security threat to the state" and both worked against the government (Bibes 2001, 244). In Colombia there were three primary organizations, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the M-19. The three groups had political agendas which were facilitated by

the narcotics trade and were funded by members of the Medellín and Cali drug cartels as well as various other guerrilla movements with the goal of causing instability in Colombia. For example, “in the mid 1980s drug lord Pablo Escobar, leader of the Medellín Cartel, found the alliance with M-19 profitable; Escobar’s syndicate produced cocaine in Colombia and prepared shipments for international distribution” (Hamm 2003, 5). “The M-19 supplied transportation out of the country and protection against government raids, paid for services, and swelled the party’s capacity for violence” (Hamm 2003, 5). “The organized crime and terrorist networks took it upon themselves to determine the best interests of the state and used competing nationalism to their own advantage” (Bibes 2001, 244).

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continues to be the major insurgent group in Colombia. The FARC is a Marxist-Leninist group which is based-on the theory that society will inevitably develop away from the oppression of capitalism to a socialist and ultimately classless society (Rhea, Steffan and Nock 1893). The FARC was “established in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party, it is Colombia’s oldest, largest, most capable, and best-equipped insurgent group” (Global Security 2007b, paragraph 1). “The FARC is governed by a secretariat, Manuel Marulanda, and six others, including senior military commander Jorge Briceño” (Global Security 2007b, paragraph 1). The FARC hoped its ideology as well as its generous pay scale would pull the disenfranchised members of Colombia into the organization. In *Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism*, “it is estimated that each FARC guerrilla makes about \$14,000 per year” (Bibes 2001, 248) compared to the per capita income of \$8,400 (CIA 2007b, paragraph 5). However, that degree of following did not happen,

even though Colombia has and continues to have a high poverty-rate and low per capita income. “The government's economic policy, democratic security strategy, and the signing of a free trade agreement with the U.S. have engendered a growing sense of confidence in the economy, particularly within the business sector” (CIA 2007b, paragraph 5).

The insurgency started off weak and it was not able to “mobilize popular support;” therefore the group developed a long-term, quasi-Marxist “strategy to take power with minimal forces” (Ovalle 2006, 57). Like other insurgencies, the number of attacks grew year after year “despite increases in defense spending,” troop increases and public outcry (Ovalle, 2006, 57). The increase in attacks occurred as the FARC grew in monies from narco-terrorism as it achieved good market penetration from the U.S. drug consumers. Additionally, the FARC benefited from reducing the government’s ability to provide law enforcement in remote areas. The FARC was able to gain momentum in the expansive ungoverned areas as the government’s law enforcement did have the reach into rural Colombia. Since most of the population lived along the coast or within urban communities, the FARC concentrated its power in rural regions. The rural regions also gave the FARC an unexpected allegiance that it needed to execute its quasi-Marxist and narco-terrorist strategy, the cocaine industry. At first the FARC “profited from the taxation of coca-growing peasants and cocaine production laboratories” (Bibes 2001, 248); however, the FARC has since moved to controlling the illicit drug industry in order to dominate the rural areas, which appears to be an intermediate goal. Figure 1 illustrates coca cultivation from 1990-2005.




Figure 1. Colombia, Coca Cultivation (ha) 1990 – 2005

Source: UNODC, *The World Drug Report 2006* (New York: United Nations Publications, 2006e), 241.

The drug trafficking industry had already been rooted in rural regions; therefore the FARC's allegiances were mutually beneficial to some rural farmers and some corrupt politicians. The drug trafficking industry provided monies, foot soldiers, safe havens, and demanded the silence of the Colombia's rural populace. Even though the people did not necessarily support the FARC's activities or its ideology, the populace stayed quiet about their activities as many worked or had family that worked in the drug trafficking industry. Consequently, the rural populace gave the FARC an advantage by assuring its security through employment, fear, coercion, and intimidation.

The FARC also had other advantages over the government; it had good leadership, a well-defined long-term strategy (financial, political, and military), political leverage, ideological basis, and a good understanding of the government and used the military tactics of the Colombian Army. Understanding the geopolitical, socioeconomic, and military structure created an insurgent organization that could adapt to changes in the governmental and military environment. Therefore, the FARC routinely analyzed any changes in military tactics or the political and social situation in Colombia. The FARC

then devised adaptive techniques to fight security forces or to force governmental change via its political leveraging. Good examples of adaptation are illustrated in the following two passages:

(Military adaptation) In 1996, things became critical as the FARC transitioned from guerrilla war to mobile war - what the Vietnamese defined as main force warfare - while the Colombian army remained in a counter-guerrilla posture. Mobile war employs large units to fight government forces but, unlike conventional war, does not seek to defend positions. While the Colombian army had spread its forces to conduct saturation patrols to fight small bands, FARC now operated in large columns, complete with crew-served weapons and artillery (improvised gas tank mortars). Predictably, the result was a series of engagements in which FARC surrounded and annihilated isolated army units. (Ovalle 2006, 59)

(Governmental change) During the late 1980s, Escobar provoked a violent confrontation against the government to force the abolition of the extradition of narco-traffickers to the United States. (Bibes 2001, 240)

“The FARC has several sources for the money”; the first is narcotics trade and the second is “kidnappings, extortions, and hijackings” (MIPT 2007b, paragraph 5). The FARC used terrorist tactics of bombings, murder, mortar attacks, kidnappings, extortions, hijackings, and unconventional/conventional military actions against Colombian political, military, and economic targets (Global Security 2007b).

The National Liberation Army (ELN) was a secondary insurgent group in Colombia that was less successful than the FARC. It too was a Marxist insurgent group inspired by urban intellectuals who were semi-followers of the Fidel Castro and Che Guevera. “The ELN was led by Carlos Arturo Velandia, alias Felipe Torres, who was imprisoned on a twenty year sentence for terrorist activities in 1994” (MIPT 2007a, paragraph 1). Felipe Torres joined the ELN after his ordination as a Catholic priest illustrating the intertwined nature of the insurgency and religion. In 2000, Torres was



granted a temporary furlough from prison to participate in peace talks with Antonio Garcia and Francisco Galan.

With the advent of the Colombia oil industry, the ELN found a new venue for insurgent activities. These activities included “kidnapping, hijacking, bombing, and the use of extortion while using minimal conventional military” operations (Global Security 2007a, paragraph 5). Each year, the ELN “conducted hundreds of ransoms and kidnappings on businessmen in the oil industry as well as others in foreign corporations” (Global Security 2007a, paragraph 5).

The Colombian Department of Administrative Security estimates that in 1998 alone, the ELN obtained U.S. \$84 million from ransoms and U.S. \$255 million from extortion. Employees of oil companies constitute a large percentage of the ELN's targets. The kidnapping and extortion of oil company employees is ELN's primary source of income. (MIPT 2007a, paragraph 3)

Unlike the FARC, the ELN was reactive vice proactive and the ELN did not have a long-term strategy. However, the ELN was still able to create instability in Colombia which assisted the FARC in gaining government recognition as a political party.

“President Uribe's strong efforts to uproot the illegal guerilla groups in Colombia had a devastating effect on the ELN; thus the government successfully uprooted the ELN from their strongholds in Antioquia and Arauca. The ELN membership has been reduced “to the point where they were all but eliminated militarily;” while the ELN is currently estimated to be down to 3000 members (Global Security 2007a, paragraph 5). Due to the increase of government and military pressure on the ELN, “it agreed to enter into peace negotiations with the Colombian government in 2006” under the mediation of Cuba (Global Security 2007a, paragraph 5).

The M-19 was the smallest yet most destructive insurgent group in Colombia, in that the M-19 conducted the most devastating attack in Latin American history (Bibes 2001, 249). The M-19 movement was founded after the election of former dictator Rojas Pinilla in 1970. Pinilla ran for presidency under the political party, the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO) and enjoyed a strong urban, poor, and intellectual support base. On April 19th, 1970, Pinilla lost the election to Misael Borrero, who ran for the National Front. The M-19 movement began as an intellectual demonstration by the ANAPO that planned to focus on Colombian governmental reform as they were outraged by the suspiciously, close election. In the mid-1970s, the M-19 transformed into a violent movement as some members “decided to embark on a violent terrorist campaign that continued for two decades and cost countless lives” (MIPT 2007d, paragraph 3). “M-19, taking its name from the date of Pinilla's presidential loss, professed support for the poor of Colombia” (MIPT 2007d, paragraph 3).

The M-19 guerrilla movement carried out the single bloodiest attack in Latin America on Colombia's Supreme Court, killing 115 civilians and nine Supreme Court justices. This attack linked the guerrillas to Carlos Lehder, a powerful narco-trafficker. The guerillas have also conducted predatory extortion against landowners (mostly drug traffickers) because of their frustration with the government regarding the delays in agrarian land reform. (Bibes 2001, 249)

The M-19's tactics were like the other groups to included kidnappings, intimidation, and imposed taxation on coca farmers. “The M-19 ceased to exist in 1990 under intense pressure from the Colombian government's security forces;” the M-19 is now a Colombian political party called the Democratic Alliance M-19 (MIPT 2007d, paragraph 4).

Another player in the Colombian insurgency is the paramilitary and private security forces. There are state security forces; police and military forces; and private

security forces for the narcotics trade. “The State Department’s 1998 Human Rights Report on Colombia states that seventy-six percent of these killings are committed by state security agents, military and police, and private security forces” (Bibes 2001, 252). The private security companies are a particular dilemma as they do not allow the government to gain control or strongly influence the country’s official security apparatus.

The FARC and ELN were private security providers to the coca farmers as well as the cartels that processed and distributed the cocaine. For the farmers, these services were mandatory, even though they did not request it. These services were the method the FARC and ELN used to extort monies from the farmers. For the cartel, the FARC was able to provide a well-trained, efficient military to protect the cartel’s drug manufactory industry. Thus, the cartels and the FARC had a mutually supporting relationship that eventually morphed into one organization. Since the monies were so large, it became in the best interests of the insurgent groups to morph with the drug trafficking industry. The monies from the coca production could fund the insurgency while concentrating power and resources.

The linkages between crime and terrorism in Colombia occurred in multiple arenas. The first was obviously financing. “The injection of drug money into the conflict not only altered the balance of forces in a financial aspect, it also entailed political consequences” (Garces 2005, 95). Since the monies were so large, the use of this money effected two primary populations, the government and the coca farmers. In order to receive protection from the narcotics private security forces, these groups needed to bend to the cartels or insurgent groups demands. The act of forced participation became latifundia of sorts, which directly countered the government’s efforts in land reform

(Garces 2005, 95). Using the money and private security forces as leverage, allowed the cartel and insurgents to gain political wins while it continued to get revenue from the coca farmers.

The second linkage between crime and terrorism lies within the acts that the insurgents commit in the conduct of the war in Colombia. The most common tactics are kidnapping, extortion, assassination, blackmail, intimidation, and imposed taxation. These activities are crimes under the FBI's definition of organized crime and can be prosecuted accordingly. Figure 2 represents the common targets for the FARC:




Figure 2. Focus of FARC Attacks by Target

Source: Smith and Damphouse, *The American Terrorism Study Database: 1980-2002* (Oklahoma: National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2007b).

### Case Study: Afghanistan

In looking at the relationship between crime, terrorism, and military operations, Afghanistan presents a unique variation. Afghanistan combines a turbulent past and a chaotic present, all the components for a fruitful criminal and terrorist relationship. This

relationship is fueled by a weak, corruptible central government; a primarily impoverished population; a weak unstable economy; and a history of war and civil unrest. Since the overthrow of Zhir Shah in 1973 by his brother-in-law and General Mohammad Daud, Afghanistan has not had a functional central government. Unlike Colombia, Afghanistan is unique in the fact that the primary criminal player in this case study was the de facto government, the Taliban.

Modern Afghanistan was established by the Pashtun with the disposal of Persian rule in mid 18th century. Afghanistan is a rural-based society with roughly 80 percent of the population employed in the agriculture industry. Social and political allegiances are based along religious, tribal, and family lines. Afghans do not have a strong nationalistic sentiment nor is there the support for a central government.

In Afghanistan the people are as diverse as the geography itself as it is physically, socially, and economically rugged. The country is a depressed economically due to location and decades of warring factions. The terrain is harsh in certain areas yet overall the country is quite diverse as it is mostly rugged mountains with arid plains in the north and southwest, as well as extreme temperature variations ranging from extremely hot summers to very cold winters. These climatic extremes and the lack of infrastructure (primarily irrigation capability) limit the country's agricultural output.

Many of the mountainous areas have a network of caves ranging from small to large elaborate structures. The cave complexes are hard to detect due the location in the mountains, the size of the caves, and position of the entrances. The caves are natural and man-made occurrences and they were used for a variety of religious purposes like fasting, meditation, solitude; Buddhist monks also used some of the caves as monasteries. The

caves also provided cover and concealment for the Taliban and allowed the insurgents to “successfully exploit the vast expanses of the desert” (O’Neill 2005, 73).

Islam was introduced in the region in the 7th century establishing an 80 percent Sunni Muslim population, which in an important distinction in the region and within the Islam. After the introduction of Islam, there has been a constant power struggle for control of the territory. Afghanistan has been subject to many invasions and power struggles through several centuries. Colonialism and the fear of conquest by outside powers (primarily the UK and the Soviet Union, whose empires encroached on Afghanistan territory in the early 19th century) afforded Afghanistan its only period of national cohesion. From 1933 to 1973, the government of Zhir Shah provided the last period of peace and stability for the Afghan people. From 1973 to 1978, there was a constant string of coups and insurgencies by the numerous warlords and warring factions. In 1978, a pro-Russian oriented-regime gained power in the region and shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. In response to the invasion, the conservative rural-based tribes rebelled. The rebellion grew into an insurgency conducted primarily by the Mujahadeen with some tribal members. Even though the Soviets had a larger, more technologically advanced military; it was unable to defeat the insurgency. Consequently in February 1989, the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan, creating a gap in government and the rule of law. The gap created disunity among the different tribes and factions of the Mujahadeen. The disunity prevented the development of a central government and led to years of infighting and near civil war. During this period of infighting, local law and order was maintained by the warlords though the use of militias. The warlord’s primary

source of income to finance the militias was earned through the unchecked transportation of opium.

During the decades of the 1980s and 90s, there was almost a power vacuum in Afghanistan. “The Communist regime in Kabul collapsed in 1992” and the various warlords and the tribes again battled for power (Engelund 2005, paragraph 1). Afghanistan was in essence “a collection of territories held together by competing warlords” (Hayes and Brunner 2006, paragraph 16). Some warlords formed loose alliances, but they were frail at best. None of the warring or competing factions really had any loyalties or allegiances to other groups as they were based-on the best judgment of the warlord. The warlord mentality affected the various Mujahadeen factions and created inter-group fighting amongst tribes and other local leaders. The inter-group fighting eventually helped to spawn the Taliban. In 1997 the Taliban, “a hardliner Pakistani-sponsored movement that fought to end the warlordism and civil war, seized power; this seizure ended warring factions and warlordism that gripped Afghanistan for two decades” (Engelund 2005, paragraph 1).

The Islamic based Taliban government instituted a harsh interpretation of Sharia law in order to control the population and bring about some order. The public order included punishments like public executions, floggings, open extortion of monies, stonings, and the extreme subordination of women. All became normal occurrences using the very harshest of penalties to regain and maintain the law and order (Hayes and Brunner 2006). The people of Afghanistan seemed to welcome the Taliban as they were weary by years of conflict and anarchy in their homeland. The replacement of the corrupt warlord system by the seemingly devout Taliban was a relief to many citizens and the

Taliban essentially became the peace mechanism during those years. Additionally, the Taliban offered some sense of normalcy to the people because it provided security and the resumption of trade and commerce. To an Afghan citizen, the Taliban was a legitimate government.

From the time the Taliban took control of the Afghan government until their ouster in 2001, they exercised ruthless control over the Afghan population using elements of the Repressive Regime Theory. To control the population, the Taliban censored information as there were no televisions, radios, nor internet access. This censorship gave the leaders of the Taliban total control over the population through a forced information vacuum and the use of large-scale influence operations, called social conditioning. In spite of Taliban's strict beliefs, this level of control afforded the Taliban the most options. It allowed them to profit from the cultivation and the illegal transportation of opium without competition from warlord or other tribal factions. It also gave the Taliban free reign over collection and the distribution of the of drug monies in Afghanistan.

The Taliban regime was not well accepted outside Afghanistan, "only Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government" while the world opinion was that the Taliban was corrupt and brutal (Hayes and Brunner 2006, paragraph 4). The Taliban was internationally labeled as an illegitimate government that "allowed terrorist organizations to flourish in their territory," one that promoted the production and smuggling of opium to further their cause and finance their activities (Hayes and Brunner 2006, paragraph 16).

Prior to 1999, it believed that the Taliban was only giving the appearance of poppy reduction by plowing poppy fields as a show of support to the international



community. Analysts at UNODC believe this was staged and subsequently shown to UN officials after the crops had been already harvested (OGD 2000, 44-45). It was also during this time that the Taliban sheltered and provided an unencumbered base of operations for terrorist organizations as well, most notably Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. Money provided by al Qaeda easily made up for any small loss of revenue from the public destruction of some small amounts of opium. Due to reporting failures in Afghanistan and other drug-producing countries, in 1999 the UNODC implemented a more aggressive method to determine drug production levels in high-yield areas. Since then, the UNODC established passive “monitoring systems in the main narcotics production countries that produces high confidence intervals” for evaluating drug production (UNODC 2006b, 399).

“In 2000, the Taliban leader Mullah Omar issued another ban on the cultivation of poppies and Omar ordered the existing poppy fields purged” (U.S. DOS 2001, paragraph 4). This was largely a symbolic gesture was aimed to again appease the international community and make it appear that the Taliban did in fact, support opium eradication. “The Taliban recognized the need for international ties and tried to create them by claiming to have drastically cut opium production in 2000,” a claim that is difficult to confirm or deny (Hayes and Brunner 2006, paragraph 7). These claims served dual purposes, (1) gained the respect of the international community and (2) lessened international pressure for observers. Thus, keeping the eyes of the world away from their heinous brutalization of the Afghan people as well as the large-scale opium production ongoing in Afghanistan, see Figure 3.




Figure 3. Afghanistan, Opium production, 1990 to 2005

Source: UNODC, *The World Drug Report 2006* (New York: United Nations Publications, 2006e), 213.

Another benefit the Taliban garnered from poppy reduction was further control of the people and the countryside. Poppy cultivation and opium production were the primary source of income for a large portion of the Afghan population. A farmer could make 10-fold growing poppies over wheat or vegetables, so if the Taliban controlled the poppy production, they controlled the population. “Since 1997, 96 percent of the opium crop had been cultivated in Taliban controlled areas” (U.S. DOS 2000, paragraph 2), which afforded the Taliban control of the sale and distribution of opium as well. In order to ensure total control, the Taliban worked to control the tribal leaders as well. To do this, the Taliban implemented poppy controls and used the tribal leaders as the intermediaries between the farmer and the manufacturer. These middlemen had allegiances to the Taliban and allowed them to rule in the manner that served their interests best. This support made the Taliban seem legitimate as they provided the goods and services to the Afghan people. The use of population controls served several purposes; first, it deterred

any rebellions, second, it concentrated power and resources and third it established allegiances into the countryside.

After the Taliban's ouster in 2001, a central government was installed under President Karzai in 2002 by coalition forces; however, his span of control was narrow with the central government exercising little control outside Kabul. The government was unable to extend the rule of law and law enforcement past the urban centers due to tribalism, the practice of sanctuary, and an inadequate police structure. Even so in October 2004, "President Karzai captured the presidency in Afghanistan's first democratic election while receiving over 55 percent of the votes" (Country Watch 2007, 34). Even with success of the elections, the country continued to be plagued by "factional violence even though the Taliban regime was ousted, and despite the establishment of a democratic government" (Country Watch 2007, 37). Under the Taliban regime, the provincial governments and municipalities were where the majority of drug production and trafficking occurred; thus Afghanistan politics is and was quite susceptible to corruption and criminal influence. Currently, criminal activity is the principle challenge to Afghanistan's central government.

Much of it stems from narcotics trafficking. Afghanistan is the world's leading producer of opium, producing over 200,000 hectares in 2004. It is the source of upwards of 80 percent of all heroin trafficked in Europe. Money laundering, principally through hawala networks, is an offshoot of the illicit trafficking in narcotics from Afghanistan, as are violence and general corruption. There is evidence to support that there are regional government officials who participate or profit from the lucrative drug trade. (Country Watch 2007, 93)

As the Taliban were forced into retreat, they lost control of drug trade as well as its revenue. To entrepreneurs, a new opportunity presented itself. The organizations that emerged were criminals, warlords, and corrupt government officials that were concerned

with enterprise and profit vice social reform. The elimination of competition as well as the security of the opium are the factors that causing criminal organizations to militarize and seek governmental affiliations in Afghanistan. Some level of security can be gained through corruption and control of government organizations; good examples are a police officer who allows freedom of illicit production in a particular area or a border control agent who allows the transportation of illegal goods or services across an unchecked border. As such, the competition between organizations for greater market share can lead to a volatile or violent business environment, now ridden with criminal elements. Consequently, organized crime wants to gain a foothold in central government for the preservation of business interests vice the desire to exercise political control or impart good policy on the people.

From 2001 to 2003, the Taliban was reduced to a hidden, albeit, not destroyed organization. The U.S. led invasion had defeated the Taliban's military capability and killed or dispersed their leadership. At the same time reconstruction was making progress and a central government had been established in Afghanistan. After years of repression the people of Afghanistan were enjoying their new freedoms; freedoms they had not known for decades. As such, these years were neither the time nor conditions for an insurgency to thrive; although the Taliban used this period to reconstitute and plan their resurgence.

As reconstruction continued, it developed milestones, These milestones were the reconstruction and establishment of order, the reduction of lawlessness, and the establishment of a legitimate police agency at local and provincial level, as well as the eradication of the poppies. Poppy eradication created a dilemma of its own as

Afghanistan and poppies have a 100-year relationship. When the reconstruction efforts failed to develop to the economic impact the international community hoped for, the farmers of Afghanistan returned to a reliable source income, poppy production. Even with massive foreign aid, reconstruction slowed and the economy moved at a slow pace in 2003. At the same time, the U.S. changed its focus from reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan to fighting a war in Iraq; this two-front war pulled the U.S. in another direction. Faced with financing two wars, the U.S. and the coalition partners had to prioritize the effort; most pressed for additional funding for Iraq. As a result, there was a funding shortage and a lack of focus on Afghanistan.

From 2003 to 2004, the Taliban effectively regained control rural Afghanistan. The Taliban realized the reconstruction efforts by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces relied heavily on the development of rural areas as well as security of the population; therefore it saw and seized the opportunity. The Taliban worked in coordination with local leaders and crime syndicates to provide security for both the crop cultivation as well as the opium ingress and egress routes of Afghanistan. Coalition forces became focused on defeating the Taliban as well as eradicating poppy cultivation, even though eradication was a double-edged sword. For the farmer, the income-level earned by the poppy can not be matched by other cash crops available to the arid Afghan climate. Plus, the poppy production provides instant monies to farmers as opium is a high-demand item on the black market of Europe and Russia. The eradication of poppy cultivation has the potential to lead to social protest, political unrest, distrust in the central government and increased attacks on coalition forces. The poppy problem is about economics; therefore, it has already become a large societal issue. Plus, this culture does

not understand why the poppy trade is illegal especially since it was introduced by the west in the early 1900s. These conditions have the potential to lead to a large-scale insurgency in Afghanistan. Consequently, poppy eradication by coalition forces may be the opportunity the Taliban needs to regain a solid foothold in Afghanistan.

As poppy eradication continues, coalition forces are moving farther away from reconstruction and more focused on force protection and security measures. This slows the economic recovery of Afghanistan, lessening the legitimacy of the coalition and the central government. With a slower recovery, the new Afghan government will be ineffective in the eyes of the people, once again opening the door for Taliban resurgence. It was the Taliban who developed the financial boom in poppy as well as the opium markets. Thus working with organized crime syndicates or tribal leaders is thought to have already become a common practice in Afghanistan. On some level the Taliban has operated as a hidden organization because they are not actively producing poppies, but are providing security to the warlords - to maintain an already established relationship. The Taliban has been using intimidation and in some cases homicides against those who actively involved in poppy eradication. The Taliban conducts these activities at the behest of the tribal or criminal syndicate but not without cost. These activities do two things; it allows the poppy production to continue while allowing the warlord or tribal leader to continue (at least the outward appearance of) supporting coalition efforts. Supporting the coalition has proven to be financially lucrative for the criminal syndicate, the warlords, the tribal leaders, and the Taliban while ensuring little to no positive impact on coalition reconstruction efforts. This cooperation ensures the warlords and tribal leaders retain their position of power and reap the benefits of coalition efforts.

Under the armed protection of the Taliban, poppy production expanded by 59 percent in 2006 alone (UNODC 2006a) and vast amounts of that money went to fund the Taliban's re-emergence. "As a result, Afghan opium is fuelling insurgency in western Asia, feeding international mafias and causing a hundred thousand deaths from overdoses every year, the UNODC Executive Director said" (UNODC 2006a, paragraph 8). Additionally, the re-emergence of the Taliban as a credible military force has yet another spiraling effect; it causes coalition forces to focus more time effort and resources to deal with force protection, security and methods to defeat the Taliban vice reconstruction. Force protection and security efforts draw coalition forces away from reconstruction and growth, which may set the conditions for the Taliban to possibly fuel a popular insurgency against the coalition forces, especially if poppy eradication remains high priority.

Since the Taliban are a trained and equipped military; it has been operating as a protection service provider for the poppy trade in Afghanistan. This service has enabled the Taliban to both amass money and rebuild their operations. The Taliban has since imbedded itself into the organized crime syndicate which has a combination of advantages for both organizations. Operating as protection service provider placed them in a position to exert control over the population, setting the stage for a renewed insurgency. For the warlords or crime syndicates, this affiliation provides a protection and intimidation service that is more efficient and cheaper than their own organizations could provide. Additionally, this affiliation gives the both organizations an alibi or additional line of defense against legal allegations.

The organized crime in Afghanistan is driven by profit and not power; this being the case, it serves the Taliban better to intimidate or even eliminate anyone who presents an impediment to these operations. It is far cleaner and allows more bargaining power if the criminal element can say they did not kill a certain public official or the drug eradication party, even if all parties concerned know it was at their direction. Likewise, a corrupt government official can use the protective services of the Taliban to intimidate or eliminate a peer competitor. This arrangement also provides the Taliban with recruitment opportunities as the Taliban controls the movement and day to day basic life in much of a countryside and municipalities. It affords them the opportunity to recruit members to the organization using both fear and coercion. For the general population, working in the poppy trade and cooperating with the Taliban and organized criminal element has added benefits. It presents the opportunity to live a more affluent life as well as providing additional security for the worker families.

The defeat of the Taliban in 2001 as well as the economic reconstruction has brought economic aid that is leading to privatization, new businesses, and property redistribution, all elements that set the conditions for economic recovery, but are providing openings for organized crime that may or may not be in coordination with the Taliban. The economic boom may give the criminal entrepreneurs the ability to operate and gain control of illicit markets, extort from the legitimate markets, and manipulate the government officials. Since the Taliban is unable to exercise single-handed control over Afghanistan or its people; there are indications that the Taliban may have formed relationships with groups who have access to the country, most notably the criminals or



warlords. Additionally, any weak, fledgling government, with decentralized control, like Afghanistan, is extremely susceptible to corrupt influences.

The Taliban has proven to be an adaptive organization that is willing to change tactics and methods in order to ensure the survivability of its political organization. From the Taliban's rise in the 1990s until the U.S. led invasion, the organization was a very visible part of Afghan life. The Taliban controls were not only on rule of law and the social structure, it also delved into legitimate or illegitimate revenue and commerce.. With the arrival of U.S. and coalition forces, the Taliban was forced to become hidden and in essence the Taliban became more of an insurgent force vice a political party. Since ousted, the Taliban has been forced to operate differently. They must now operate under the radar of western media, militaries, financial organizations, and international authorities. The Taliban has successfully adapted while playing on their strengths to include: a ruthlessness military capability - relative to the population - and the tenacity to rebuild their military and political arm to fight coalition forces.

In order to maintain a foothold on Afghanistan, the Taliban must regain foothold in the government whether through legitimate or illegitimate means. To do this, the Taliban has attempted to re-emerge as a legitimate military using their former governmental role and allegiances to work towards their strategic objective of recapturing power in Afghanistan. By continuing to help develop the illicit drug trade, the Taliban can move to destroy the legitimacy of both the coalition efforts and the Afghan government. Legitimacy is the center of gravity for both the insurgents and counterinsurgents (FM 3-07, D-3); however, the Taliban is in a unique position as the organization that can undermine the legitimacy of the government while raising the

perception of their own legitimacy in ways coalition forces and the Afghan government cannot. The Taliban can convey the perception of legitimacy simply through continuing a protracted war while refusing to allow the coalition and the Afghan government to succeed. The legitimacy can be achieved in two ways; the first, via the Islamic belief that foreigners must be driven from Islamic lands and second, by limiting the effectiveness of government in Afghanistan. At the same time, the Taliban can continue to intimidate the populace and exert extensive influence. Its influence will be a difficult cycle to break without an effective Afghan police force, backed by a strong central government, and an efficient rule of law that extends into the rural areas.

While National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-221 defines drug trafficking as a threat to national security, military forces are not to become directly involved in law enforcement activities that fight drugs, and must always be conducted in support of one or more governmental agencies (Reagan Administration 1986, 2) (see Appendix B). To this end, training a legitimate Afghan force is the most viable and effective way to fight the Taliban, organized crime, and the drug trade in Afghanistan.

Since 2001, massive reconstruction efforts were underway in Afghanistan using the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) led by military and interagency personnel. Using these specialize teams, Afghanistan has begun to make improvements in infrastructure as well as the living conditions. At the same time, there are 700 U.S. police trainers who train the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). These training programs were undertaken with some level of success even though both programs have suffered from under-resourcing. The under-resourcing was apparent in 2003 when the Taliban re-emerged and drew forces away from law enforcement to

provide security. To effectively defeat the drug trade while simultaneously stimulating the economy, there must be a trained and effective police force; one for public safety and the other for law enforcement. Consequently, defeating a criminal element or a drug problem is a police issue, not simply a military one.

The ANP has been undermanned and it has been difficult to manage because of the number of districts and the quality of the personnel. There are 355 police districts divided among the 34 provincial-level capitals. Since 2001 coalition forces have trained 60,000 Afghan police, but many are still unaccounted for. At the provincial-level, there is a uniformed police presence with some connection to the National Command Authority (NCA), but at the district-level there are many non-uniformed, untrained, and likely criminal elements exercising police authority.

In the next two years the U.S. will surge more than two billion dollars in an effort to train, equip, and employ a viable ANP force. The plan is to use U.S. police mentors, a 3,500-man force that will be employed to train all aspects of law enforcement. The training includes command and control, the National Command Center, and police and counter drug operations at the district and local levels. The training will also include additional equipment such as vehicles and communications equipment will also be provided to improve the effectiveness of the ANP. Police reforms will be undertaken to root out criminal and corrupt police officers in order to provide an effective police force that provides security and is free of corruption, which is the basic step to governance, stability as well as defeating the drug trade and the insurgency.

The ANA training program has been more successful; it has embedded U.S. trainers and the ANA has a functioning chain of command. The ANA has a sense of

“pride and have been called the first element of national unity in Afghanistan in 100 years” (McCaffrey 2007, 4).

In general, the ANA is admired and trusted by the population. It is developing a strong central command authority and has successfully mixed ethnic formations who are willing to fight. The ANA wants to shoulder the majority of the fight to take control of their own country; however, the ANA lacks mobility and combat equipment. The ANA is limited by no national logistics or maintenance system and most are equipped with some form of light-wheeled armor, and effective fire support systems (mortars or light artillery). This force could become a dominant battle force capable of providing the necessary security to allow reconstruction to continue, to keep the forces of the Taliban at bay, and allow a strong national police force to grow and exercise law enforcement. The way to allow Afghanistan to become a functioning law-based state is to create a functioning Afghan Security Force (police and army) that can provide for its own internal security. A force of this kind will have a far better ability to defeat criminal elements, insurgents while creating a national unity.

The crime and terrorism linkages in Afghanistan center on the drug trade and terrorist training camps. First of all, the drug trade was operated by a syndicate of networks of tribal leaders, who at the time were ultimately controlled by the Taliban. Second, “the Taliban allowed terrorist organizations to run training camps in their territory and from 1994 until the U.S. invasion in 2001” (Hayes and Brunner 2006, paragraph 16). On two separate occasions, the UN Security Council passed resolutions demanding “the Taliban cease their support for terrorism and hand over bin Laden for trial” (Hayes and Brunner 2006, paragraph 16). Following the terrorists attacks on

September 11th, 2001, the U.S. pressured the Taliban to turnover bin Laden, and they refused. On October 7th, 2001 the U.S. began a campaign to oust the Taliban and by the end of 2001 the Taliban had been routed. “Many of the Taliban’s most radical leaders were killed, captured, or fled, but the Taliban as an organization was not gone” (Hayes and Brunner 2006, paragraph 2). Many of the leaders “returned to their homes to continue to work for the goal of an Islamic state” (Hayes and Brunner 2006, paragraph 21).

| Table 3. Colombia and Afghanistan Comparison  |             |  |             |
|---|-------------|--|-------------|
| Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)   |             | Taliban  |             |
| Incidents   | Casualties  | Incidents  | Casualties  |
| 614   | 1,235       | 356  | 690         |
| 654 Fatalities, 531 Domestic Incidents  |             | 852 Fatalities, 307 Domestic Incidents   |             |
| 83 International Incidents  |             | 49 International Incidents   |             |
| Targets:  |             | Targets:   |             |
| Unknown   | 0.02        | Unknown  | 0.02        |
| Military  | < 1 percent | Military   | < 1 percent |
| Airports and Airlines   | 0.01        | Airports and Airlines  | 0.03        |
| Utilities   | 0.22        | Utilities  | < 1 percent |
| Business  | 0.07        | Business   | 0.05        |
| Diplomatic  | < 1 percent | Diplomatic   | 0.04        |
| Police  | 0.07        | Police   | 0.21        |
| Religious Figures Institutions  | 0.01        | Religious Figures Institutions   | 0.03        |
| Transportation  | 0.09        | Transportation   | < 1 percent |
| Telecommunication   | 0.01        | Telecommunication  | < 1 percent |
| Private Citizens and Property   | 0.07        | Private Citizens and Property  | 0.08        |
| NGO   | < 1 percent | NGO  | 0.04        |
| Educational Institutions  | < 1 percent | Educational Institutions   | 0.04        |
| Terrorists/Former Terrorists  | < 1 percent | Terrorists/Former Terrorists   | < 1 percent |
| Other   | 0.03        | Other  | 0.06        |
| Countries that FARC employed international terrorism                                    |             | Countries that Taliban employed international terrorism  |             |
| Colombia  | 98 percent  | Afghanistan  | 95 percent  |
| Panama, Venezuela   | < 1 percent | India  | < 1 percent |
| Ecuador, Brazil   | < 1 percent | Pakistan   | < 4 percent |
| Strength: Approx 12,000 members   |             | Strength: Unknown  |             |
| Classification: Communist/Socialist   |             | Classification: Religious  |             |
| Last Attack: 12/7/2006  |             | Last Attack: 11/26/2006  |             |
| Financial Sources: Cocaine trafficking and production; Extortion; kidnapping; Hijacking |             | Financial Sources: Formerly, the Taliban funded itself though the revenue of poppy and support from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence |             |

Source: Smith and Damphouse, *The American Terrorism Study Database: 1980-2002* (Oklahoma: National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2007c).

### Case Study: Algeria

The Algerian case study provides an early look, the 1950's, of the organized crime and terrorist nexus. Prior to the Algerian War, there is little information about a nexus of this sort as globalization was just restarting. Like Colombia and Afghanistan the Algerian insurgency had criminal activity intermixed; although the criminal activity was at a lower level. The activity was traditional illegal activities common to criminal organizations that was initially focused on French forces and subsequently shifted to the populace. The shifting focal point was implemented to gain the support of the populace either by passive measures or through aggressive measures like the use terror and fear.

Unlike governments of Colombia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Algeria had a democratic government; although it functioned much like the other countries' governments. The Algerian government was structured to limit the indigenous population in representation in the parliament, local government, the police force, and in commerce. These controls effectively made the French-led Algerian government a de facto repressive regime as it maintained the wide divide between the classes and implemented social controls that were mostly based-on religion, ethnicity, lineage, and race. All positions of power in Algeria were either French settlers or Algerians who were of French descent; consequently the minority colons governed Algeria. This minority became a ruling class who made and enforced the rule of law while controlling the commerce in Algeria. Even though the central "government was endowed with vast superior strength, it was ideologically handicapped and burdened with the responsibility of maintaining law and order" (Galula 1962, 5). Additionally, the central government delivered broken promises to the Algerian majority by arresting Muslim leaders who

pressed for change as well as implementing weak or feeble reformatory legislation. Consequently, the central government was not trusted by the Algerian majority due to its repressive politics, the positioning of a French minority into the government as well as other positions of authority in the country. These events led to a culmination point, known as the Algerian Insurgency.

The insurgency and overall instability was the population's response to the social inequality and land apportionment in Algeria. Thus, the socio-political factors that contributed to the Algerian insurgency were a corrupt government system, the French hegemonic tendencies, and the lack of governmental reforms for the Algerian populace. In 1954, "when the Algerian insurgents launched their rebellion, the political and military situation in Algeria augured well for the insurgent's success, due to a succession of weak governments throughout the French empire" (Galula 1963, xvii).

In order to contain the French populace, the government implemented several measures "to reduce potential criticism while gaining support for the Algerian war" (Merom 2004, 608). These measures included an aggressive information operations campaign on the home front, limitations of soldier strength in Algeria, and the suppression of casualty and fatality rates from the war. The information campaign was designed to turn "the Algerian War into a menace to the democratic life of France" (Merom 2004, 612) as it insisted that Algeria and France were one nation. These measures were designed "to show military progress while minimizing the alienating effect of casualty and fatality rates" (Merom 2004, 608).

In the beginning of the conflict, the French government and the Army sought to wage war with the smallest number of soldiers possible. Accordingly, the government



was slow to allocate additional forces to the Algerian War, even though the military build-up was necessary. There were also other reasons for the slow build-up; it included other world commitments, underestimation of the nature of the conflict, military arrogance, and the desire to maintain popular support. The troop build-up became a necessity due to Algeria's "size, the difficult terrain, the scattered rural Muslim population, fluid borders, the deficient French bureaucracy at grass root level, and minimal French forces in country;" for those reasons, it took very few insurgents to control the population" (Galula 1963, 18). The following chart shows troops increases over 4 years:

Table 4. Algeria Troop Strength 1954-57

| Year           | 1954   | 1955    | 1956    | 1957    |
|----------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|
| Troop Strength | 65,000 | 110,000 | 390,000 | 415,000 |

Source: Riggs, *Counter-Insurgency Lessons from the French-Algerian War* (Newport: The Naval War College, 2004), 2.

Algeria is the second largest country in Northern Africa. It is bordered by Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Western Sahara. It has 6343 km of shared borders, 998 km of coastline along the Mediterranean Sea, and 2,381,741 sq km of territory; is has 48 provinces with Algiers as the capital (CIA 2007a, paragraph 2). Algeria is "arid to semiarid with mild to wet winters; it has hot, dry summers along coast, drier with cold winters, and hot summers on the high plateaus" (CIA 2007a, paragraph 2). Algeria has Sahara winds, which "are hot, sand-laden hurricane-speed winds, called Sirocco, that are especially common in summer" (CIA 2007a, paragraph 2). Algeria has

several natural resources, they are “petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, phosphates, uranium, lead, and zinc” (CIA 2007a, paragraph 2).

Most Algerians are Arab, Berber, or Arab-Berber descent; this accounts for 99 percent of the population with 1 percent of the population being purely European descent. “The Berbers, beginning in the late 7th century A.D., adopted the Arabic language and Islam from the small number of Arabs who settled in the country” (Algeria 2005, paragraph 3). The Berbers are mixed group of people with Phoenician, European, Arab, Turkish, and Jewish descent, which accounts for the variations in skin, hair, and eye color. The Berbers have traditionally lived in Northern Africa and are structured along clan lines.

Almost all Berbers are Muslims, but various pre-Islamic religious elements survive among them, chiefly the worship of local saints and the veneration of their tombs. Women have a greater degree of personal freedom among the Berbers than they do among Arabs, and Berber local governments tend to be more communal and less authoritarian than their Arab counterparts. (Berber 2007, paragraph 5)

“More than 80 percent of Algerians live along the Mediterranean coastlands on only 12 percent of the country's land;” although the mountainous regions of the Algeria are home to the nomadic people - the Tuareg (Algeria 2007, paragraph 1). The Tuareg were converted to Islam in the 7th century; although most were reluctant to convert (Algeria 2005, paragraph 3). Even though the Tuareg converted to Islam, many retained their clan identities as well as customs and courtesies. The majority of Algerians are Sunni Muslims who speak Arabic, the country's sole official language. Both language and religion were mandated by the current repressive regime – somewhat a mix of fundamentalism and Marxism. The dialects of French and Berber are still spoken in some parts of Algeria.

In 1954, the country counted a booming population of 8.4 million Muslims, plagued by 25 percent unemployment, and about 990,000 European colons who accounted for most of the local wealth. Algeria was neither a colony nor a protectorate; it was a grouping of three French departments under the same metropolitan laws as other departments, seen as a full part of the republic (Chevreuil 2006, paragraph 4).

The French settlers who lived in Algeria owned all the means for economic improvement to include the banking systems, farms, and businesses, thereby making it almost impossible for Algerian natives to acquire money for new business ventures.

“In an effort to oust the French colonial government, an nationalist group, calling itself the National Liberation Front (FLN) commenced the Algerian War on the eve of All Saints Day, October 31st, 1954” (Riggs 2004, 1). The FLN conducted an attack on the French settlers who resided in Algeria striking with coordinated bombings, murders and sabotages throughout Algeria (Riggs 2004). This tactic of coordination enabled the FLN to gain international exposure and media coverage, mostly targeted at the UN and metropolitan France. A good example can be seen in a passage from in *The Pacification of Algeria* by Galula, which related FLN activity to UN meetings; the excerpt stated that “every year, November–December 1955-1957 about the time the General Assembly met in New York and discussed the Algerian problem, the rebels increased their activity” (Galula 1963, 6). Consequently, the media gave the insurgency a venue to propagate its message that allowed the organization to recruit and gain monies from the populace and other supporters. In the end the FLN was able to “increase its power and activity throughout Algeria, dictate the pace of war, and establish itself as the leading force behind the Algerian national struggle” (Merom 2004, 604).

The Algerian War had a marked impact on metropolitan France, as it created controversy, outrage, and polarization of the French people. The polarization occurred in

metropolitan France as the war skewed the French people's view of itself. The heavy-handed method the Army used to deal with the insurgency created a "struggle over the issues of world purpose and national identity that doomed the war effort" (Merom 2004, 601). As information about the Algerian War infiltrated "the French marketplace of ideas, it accelerated the process of radicalization at home" (Merom 2004, 601). This radicalization forced the French people and leaders to "choose between two mutually exclusive options" – democracy in Algeria or defeat (Merom 2004, 601). Meanwhile, metropolitan France continued to receive information about the war from multiple sources, to include the media, short-term conscripts, Algerian citizens living in France, and the French government. The government's account of the Algerian War did not match with that of the other sources. Consequently, the populace became suspicious of the government and its policies in Algeria as stories of the Army's torture and brutality arose. The government's policies (or lack thereof) that allowed for torture and brutality of Algerians directly clashed with the French population's self-image. The French's self-image, identity intact, allowed the French to survive the occupation of WWII.

In the 1950s, France tried to keep its empire going during the dying days of Algeria: the unfortunate result was not that France extended itself to Algeria, but that Algeria extended itself to France. France was then vulnerable to an unassimilated minority containing an indeterminate number of people who were not just a troubling electoral factor but were literally ready to make trouble -- as the arrests of alleged terrorists in France became clear (Amiel 2003, paragraph 8).

In 1954 when the French Army withdrew from Indochina, it immediately began operations in North Africa. The French Army was superior to the Algerian insurgents as it was war-trained, very disciplined, extremely organized, and very proficient against guerrilla tactics from its experience in Indochina. Upon arrival to the Algerian theater of operations, the French began an aggressive campaign to break the insurgency; although it

took a full year for rigorous implementation. The French's strategy in Algeria was to dissect the country on a territorial basis to systematically defeat insurgent forces and secure territorial boundaries to prevent external intervention. It suppressed the population using control measures, used conventional and unconventional tactics against the insurgents, and conducted civil-military cooperation in the conduct of the war. The French used counter-insurgency techniques that were perfected in Indochina and put into action in Algeria. The tactical plan had five important facets; these were:

The French employed superb use of psychological operations to counteract the FLNs use of social conditioning in the populace.

The French were highly successful at gathering human intelligence.

The French dispersed their forces through a strategy of quadrillage which deployed the Army into a permanently assigned area and a mobile reserve. The mobile reserve covered conventional operations to include border operations or reactionary forces.

Over time, the French conducted their operations using a measured response, avoiding reprisals and excessive use of force on the population.

Finally, the French Army improved the officer's understanding of the individual, the culture, and the terrorist. The cultural training included Muslim sociology, revolutionary warfare tactics, the adversary and his ways, and finally the tactical and psychological struggle against the rebellion. (Riggs 2004, 5-6)

The French also conducted activities that complemented military operations and worked against the insurgents support-base; these activities included promoting women's rights; the emphasis of policing rather than military tactics in countering an insurgency; the critical importance of an effective information operations campaign; the importance of sealing off the borders; and the imperative of separating the insurgents from the population while not alienating population" (Galula 1963, v-vi).

“On November 1st, 1954, the FLN declared war, initiating 70 quasi-simultaneous attacks, murders, or bombings in 30 different locations within three hours. These attacks were called La Toussaint Rouge” or Red All Saints Day, referring to the bloodstained devastation that was to ensue (Chevreuil 2006, paragraph 7) and primarily ensued in the cities including the capital city of Algiers. The FLN selected an urban-warfare strategy due the physical characteristics of Algeria and the French Army’s overmatch to the insurgent group. In order to achieve regime change, the FLN had to maximize the use of the cities, the desert plains and the international media to achieve the results necessary to sway the French populace in metropolitan France. Therefore, the urban-warfare strategy was adopted in Algeria even though it was somewhat risky as it was not yet successful in 1954. The use of “cities have not been suitable for strategies that call for substantial guerilla warfare or a prolonged military-focus strategy that involves considerable terrorism in urban centers” (O’Neill 2005, 71).

The 7-year war terminated the career of six French prime ministers and re-opened the presidency to Charles de Gaulle. Charles de Gaulle was the only French leader that could stop the war, re-create unity within France, and re-energize the floundering democracy. The Algerian War divided the French nation and brought communist parties very close to gaining power in France. “By 1958 it was clear that France was losing the war; it was discredited by its failure to subdue the Algerian rebels and the Fourth Republic was overthrown by General Charles de Gaulle” (Houngnikpo 2003, paragraph 6).

The struggle in Algeria was hydra-headed. In fact, there were several wars going on at the same time: the counter-insurgency; a civil war between Algerians; the external battle fought for public opinion in metropolitan France, and on the

platforms of the U.N.; the struggle between the pieds noirs (French colonists in North Africa) and Paris, culminating in army revolt, followed by open, white terrorism (Horne 2004, 30).

Like other insurgencies, the FLN had outside supporters; they were Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya. These countries were also Muslim countries and “would eventually play an important role in the war by actively supporting the liberation movement” (Chevreuil 2006, paragraph 4). These countries provided a support network for Algeria that consisted of financial and military support. For domestic, international, and reasons of commerce, “France was unwilling to set Algeria free; therefore the achievement of freedom from French colonial rule” was not an option in 1954 (Houngnikpo 2003, paragraph 3). As such, the French opted to quell the insurgency through lessons-learned in Indochina.

“By the time the war ended with the FLN's "victory" in 1962, over a quarter million Algerians had died and the same number had fled the fighting as refugees, with an additional two million being forcibly regrouped by the French in desert concentration camps” (Houngnikpo 2003). “Despite great FLN efforts to terrorize the Algerian society, it never managed to organize a general strike, ignite a widespread popular uprising against the French, or force adequate compliance with its instructions” (Merom 2004, 605). Even though the insurgents were never able to put up a formidable fight, they were still able to force French capitulation in Algeria--mostly due to public opinion.

When determining the criminal activity in the Algerian War, one must look to the definition of crime and organized crime itself. The type of crimes and tactics in the Algerian insurgency are traditional illegal activities common to organized crime. The FBI “defines organized crime as any group having some manner of a formalized structure and

whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities” (FBI 2006, paragraph 2). The Algerian terrorist attacks were criminal acts used to “mobilize the people, resolve the peasant question, coordinate the town-countryside struggle, resolve the problem of national minorities and religious sects, and elevate the level of organization and political consciousness” (Mines 2006, paragraph 12). The FLN developed a war-fighting strategy to gain political power and leverage the organization nationally.

The FLN began with a wave of “blind terrorism,” designed to attract publicity for the movement and to spread fear and insecurity, and to go on to a campaign of “selective terrorism” through which to acquire control of the population in a very short time. Once the rebels had secured the willing or forced complicity of the people (a goal they achieved early in the Algerian war), they were ready to launch guerrilla warfare. From there, they were prepared to go on to larger-scale engagements if necessary. (Galula 1963, xviii)

The linkages between crime and terrorism occurred when reviewing the tactics. There is no actual numerical data for FLN terrorist acts in Algeria 1954-62; however, many of the written works on Algeria describe the tactics of the insurgency. These tactics are crimes as stated by the FBI; the following list illustrates common tactics used during the Algerian War:

|                          |                                  |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Bribery                  | Kidnapping                       |
| Murder                   | Arson                            |
| Money Laundering         | Obstruction of Justice           |
| Murder for Hire          | Alien Smuggling                  |
| Exploitation of children | Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods |
| Robbery                  |                                  |

(FBI 2006, paragraph 3)

Another example of criminal conduct in the Algerian War is that represented by the character of the insurgents as seen in the following passage:

The leaders of the rebellion were political nonentities: Ben Bella, a former noncommissioned officer in the French Army condemned for a post-office



robbery; Krim Belkacem, a former corporal who had killed a rural policeman because he had been preferred to him for the job. None of the educated Algerians, none of the bourgeois, none of the known nationalist figures had participated in the movement. Not only had they been deliberately left out, but Ben Bella had ordered the liquidation of any possible “interlocuteurs valables [worthy intermediaries].” So there remained only one possible course of action, to fight the rebellion. (Galula 1963, 9)

In Algeria 1954-62, the FLN opted to use organized crime and terrorist cells jointly in order to gain the control and the collaboration of the criminal elements. This method allowed the FLN to increase the insurgent force while simultaneously implementing a complimentary plan to obtain control of the populace using the FLN Restriction, see Table 5. This method primarily used fear, coercion and intimidation for the population and organized crime.

There were other crimes, usually regarded as victimless crimes like prostitution, drug trafficking, the sexual exploitation of children, or gambling; these crimes were restricted by FLN. There are several reasons for the FLN’s restrictions. First, since the FLN was an Islamic fundamentalist group, it sought to remove these vices from the Algerian populace. Second, the FLN saw these vices as western influence vice a community problem. Third, controlling the sexuality or the other vices of populace through Islamic fundamentalism afforded the FLN more social controls over the population. “When one seeks to control sexuality, reproductive capacity, financial autonomy and even freedom of movement” (Satkunanathan 2006, paragraph 3); it is exercising hegemony or domination. Therefore, the FLN social controls enabled the organization to limit the population’s autonomy and subsequently influence the work environment, the politics, the home and ultimately the population itself. The FLN in essence forced Islamic fundamentalism as the religion of choice and positioned the FLN

to gain wealth, position, and power in Algeria in the coming years. Lastly, the most important reason that the FLN issued restrictions was to position the ALN and FLN as the legitimate voice for the people of Algeria. When the FLN's issued the restrictions (see Table 5) in an attempt to control the population; this was the first phase of the social controls. When the people abided by these rules, the FLN was became an informal influencer and the voice for the people of Algeria.

| Table 5. FLN Restrictions   |
|---|
| 1. Confiscation of all individual arms in order to enrich the stock of the FLN.   |
| 2. Elimination of drug trafficking to include cocaine, opium, and kif.  |
| 3. Elimination of games of chance (gambling) and the ignominious exploitation that is prostitution, while waiting for the later creation of conditions for the complete liquidation of this plague. |
| 4. A selection in order to detect those elements still healthy and recoverable and capable of voluntarily accepting the difficult sacrifices of the combat for national independence.               |
| 5. Gathering of information and funds, and the placing at our disposition of safe refuges.  |

Source: Yacef, *Souvenirs de la Bataille d'Alger* (France: The Notre Journal, 196), 2.

### Case Study: Iraq

Like the other insurgencies, Iraq has criminal and terrorist activity intermixed and it can probably be categorized as a low-level nexus on the rise. The researcher speculates that Iraq has the potential to be a high-level nexus due to the growth of illicit markets probably in the weapons smuggling, gun-for-hire, and the drug transportation industries. This growth would allow organized crime to grow and dominant the Iraqi cash economy as well as the country's illegal commerce.

Currently, the criminal activity in Iraq includes common offenses to organized crime like kidnapping, assassinations, murders and corruption-related activities. According to the Brookings Institution, “it is no longer practical to differentiate between acts of war and crime; our estimates since January 2006 are based upon the numbers published in the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report: 1 May–30 June, 2006” (O’Hanlon and Campbell 2007, 19). The following charts demonstrate the violence in Iraq from 2003 to 2006, Brookings reported:

| Table 6. Estimates of Iraqi Civilians Killed by Violence                                |                 |
|---|-----------------|
| Iraq Index Estimate using IBC Data – May 2003 – December 31, 2005, not including crime: | 19,500          |
| Iraq Index Estimate using IBC Data – May 2003 – December 31, 2005, including crime:     | 42,100          |
| Iraq Index Estimate using UN Data – January 2006 – December 2006:                       | 34,452          |
| Iraq Index Cumulative Estimate using IBC and UN Data – May 2003 – December 31, 2006:    | 76,500          |
| Iraq Body Count Cumulative Total through 15 December 2006:                              | 53,000 – 59,000 |

Source: O’Hanlon and Campbell, *Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2007), 19.

| Table 7. Iraqis Kidnapped |                             |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| January 2004              | 2 per day in Baghdad        |
| December 2004             | 10 per day in Baghdad       |
| January 2006              | Up to 30 per day in Baghdad |
| March 2006                | 30-40 per day nationwide    |

Source: O’Hanlon and Campbell, *Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2007), 22.

In Iraq, organized crime is not a new phenomenon, as it existed under Saddam Hussein. When Saddam was president he handled criminals very brutally; therefore criminals had two options: state cooperation or heavy-handed penalties to include torture, death, or disappearance. If the criminal organization did not bend to the government's will, it was eliminated or imprisoned. Thus organized crime is very hardened and accustomed to working under dangerous conditions. In the past, it was likely that Iraqi organized crime worked alongside state security, intelligence, the military, and the Baath Party to bring goods and services to the country as well as maintain the state's linkages to the outside world. The loss of governmental ties has not caused organized crime to shrink; it simply caused them to seek new methods and partners. Actually the lack of regulation and governance has afforded organized crime increased opportunities. New linkages and leaders will continue to emerge, perhaps militia leaders, government party members, government employees, or insurgent leaders. Coalition forces must act to stem the growth of organized crime, for two main reasons. First, the immediate effect of criminal activity is fueling, funding, and equipping the insurgency. Second, an emerging Iraqi crime organization will be establishing links with other known organized crime or transnational groups in the Balkans, Russia, other former Soviet states, Asia, Africa, and of course, the rest of the Middle East, including Israel.

In the *Report to Congress: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, it states that "the conflict in Iraq has changed from a predominantly Sunni-led insurgency against foreign occupation to a struggle for the division of political and economic influence among sectarian groups and organized criminal activity" (USG, USE-I, and GOI 2007, 14). Hence, organized crime and the "garden variety" street crime are growing problems

that present a unique challenge to the coalition efforts to ensure a safe and secure Iraq. Organized crime is aggressively employing corruption-related activities as well as conducting violent crime, intimidation, kidnappings, assassinations, attacks on infrastructure, and other acts designed to alter the economic status quo. Obviously, criminal activity goes directly against rule of law, a vital component for a stable environment. This type of activity not only presents a problem for coalition forces but to the legitimacy of Government of Iraq (GOI) as well. Criminal activity directly provides arms and funding for the militias and it provides terrorists and criminals for the insurgency. This convoluted mix of anti-coalition forces represents a problem to the military and its ability to differentiate their activities from insurgent activities.

Due to the turbulent environment and the lack governance, Iraq is a perfect breeding ground for organized and transnational crime. First, the rule of law does not extend throughout the depth of the country and the Iraqi people do not have trust or confidence in the legislative or judicial process. This lack of trust is a remnant from the Saddam years as he ruled based on his preferences vice using the governmental process. Ruling via preference and partiality created an imbedded practice of corruption: corruption or the abuse of public office for private gain is one of the failings of oil-based governments and countries like Iraq. A good example of the corruption is the Iraqi “Security forces who remain prone to intimidation by or collusion with militias and criminal gangs, thereby decreasing the confidence among ordinary Iraqis in their legitimate security force” (USG, USE-I, and GOI 2007, 6). Additionally, Iraq also has porous borders, a hardened criminal underclass, and access to the weapons smuggling industry in the region. Weapons smuggling is thought to be coming from multiple countries to include Iran, Syria,

Moldavia, and Russia. “International criminals, terrorists, or alien smugglers have little concern about international governance or legal norms” (Smith 2000, 77).

Unlike organized crime and its perpetrators, terrorists usually learn by a formal training period resembling a military training camp or a thorough indoctrination at cell meetings. Criminals conversely learn from other criminals in prison, in the home, or through affiliations or gangs. Many prisons have a subculture that indoctrinates new inmates; this indoctrination includes methods to survive in prison, a gang or group membership, coping mechanisms for the social isolation, and new crime associates.

In Iraq, concerns remain that the Iraqi Corrections Service is increasingly infiltrated by criminal organizations and militias. Detention facilities in Iraq do not meet incarceration needs. Pre-trial detention facilities in Iraq, administered by the MOI, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the MOJ, are reported to be overcrowded, substandard facilities with poor detainee accountability practices. Post-trial prisons, administered by the MOJ, generally meet international standards, but are at maximum capacity. (USG, USE-I, and GOI 2007, 7)

In 2005, the researcher visited Abu Ghraib in Baghdad, and noticed the shanks, sling shots, and strangulation devices that were confiscated by the prison guards; all were unconventional homemade devices (see Appendix A). Homemade weapons are crafted by prisoners and they usually share the techniques to make them. In conventional prisons, these weapons are made for self-defense; although sometimes the homemade weapons are used on the prison guards. Homemade prison weapons are very common in U.S. federal, state, and contract prisons; although the more complex and intricate weapons are usually produced in a place that has career criminals or inmates with high rates of recidivism. With the innovation of the Internet, criminals are also imparting their knowledge about homemade weapons there as well; although there are very little Internet users in Iraq - less than 1 percent (O’Hanlon and Campbell 2007, 46). Therefore, these

criminals probably learned these weapon-making skills inside the prison or through affiliations with other like groups.

Due to this criminogenic community in Iraqi prisons, the U.S. Army must identify career criminals, who are accustomed to working in a highly dangerous and threatening environment. Organized or transnational crime uses sophisticated tactics that may be transmitted to terrorist or insurgent groups as well. A good example of these tactics is though the use of secure communications. A common method to communicate in Iraq is though the use of branding or tattooing. Many criminal groups use nondescript or nonverbal forms of communication to identify themselves within a particular criminal community using tattoos, branding or logos. Another tactic is the use of cell burners, a pre-paid cell phone or disposable phone.

The linkages between crime and terrorism that are most visible in Iraq occur in arms trafficking as it has a direct impact on coalition operations. One known source of weapons is the pro-Russian regime in an area called Transnistria, which is connected to the so-called Russian Mafia. The Russian Mafia is has taken over the influence of the former KGB and many KGB operatives have become involved in organized crime, a phenomena that could yet happen with the Baathist party. These former operatives live on monies from sex-slavery, money laundering, and arms trafficking. "In Soviet times," Ariel Cohen said, "the Soviet KGB had connections with all kind of terror groups in the Middle East and these connections remain in place until this day" (Lane 2007, paragraph 3).

| Table 8. Algeria and Iraq Comparison  |   |  |
|---------------------------------------|---|--|
| Similarities                          | Algeria   | Iraq   |
| Media                                 | “The brutality was highly visible because Algiers, as the capital, attracted the media's spotlights and the public's interest in the details of Fighting” (Merom 2004, 610).                          | Media, both western and regional, highlights “questionable” coalition activities and insurgent successes. Highlights brutality of conflict – lessens popular support |
| Location of Intense struggle          | “Due to Algiers’s centrality and significance, it also encouraged a intense struggle between the FLN and the French Army.” (Merom 2004, p. 610).  | Baghdad is Iraqi Center of Gravity - 90 percent of the insurgent activity occurs in and around the city – “as goes Baghdad, so goes Iraq”                            |
| Geography                             | Sahara desert ; Hot and dry   | Arid, primarily desert with mountains in the north and west  |
| People                                | 99 percent Arab-Berber  | 80 percent Arab, 20 percent Kurd   |
| Religion                              | 99 percent Sunni Muslim   | 60 percent Shia, 37 percent Sunni, 3 percent other   |
| External Supports                     | Tunisia and Morocco   | Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia  |
| Policy of self-determination          | A group of people with some degree of national consciousness, are enabled to form their government  | Elected Council of Representatives, Iraqi Transitional Government – drafted constitution   |
| Repressive Regimes                    | French minority government and its controls effectively made the Algerian government a de facto repressive regime, in that it limited and maintained and the indigenous population’s access to power. | Saddam Hussein dictatorship<br>Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)<br>Iraqi Transition Gov – Sunni minority lead – seen as U.S. puppet                             |
| Lifestyle of the foreigners           | Owned the businesses, ruled Algeria; the pieds noirs had a better quality of life   | Better living conditions, more safe and secure then population in general  |
| Political Leadership                  | De Gaulle   | Bush administration  |
| Insurgent leadership                  | Ben Bella and Krim Belkacem   | Al Queda, militia’s, al Sadr   |
| Conduct of the insurgency             | Insurgents<br>- bourgeoisie<br>- unemployed proletariat<br>- criminals  | Insurgents<br>- Islamic Radical<br>- Sectarian<br>- criminals; as 50 bucks thugs   |
| Military Tactics                      | - population control measures<br>- operational tactics<br>- civil military operations   | - gain population support<br>- “search and destroy” insurgents<br>- place Iraqi Army in lead<br>- Civil military operations  |
| Indigenous support                    | Berber or Kabyle peoples  | Kurdish people   |
| Killed in action (KIA) and Casualties | 20,000 KIA; 60,000 wounded  | 3000+ KIA; 20,000 wounded<br>6000+ Iraqi Security Force KIA  |

Source: Smith and Damphouse, *The American Terrorism Study Database: 1980-2002*, (Oklahoma: National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2007c).



Chapter 4 used the case study template to draw comparisons on crime and terrorism and chapter 5 will use the analysis to draw conclusions and make recommendations.

## CHAPTER 5.

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis addressed the following research question: “Is there a relationship between crime and terrorism?” To answer this question, a number of case studies were analyzed to answer the secondary questions: (1) Do criminal networks work in coordination with terrorist networks?; (2) How will transnational crime affect military operations?; (3) How is crime employed on the battlefield?; (4) What might this threat look like – organization, money, structure, motives and affiliations?; and (5) What are the points of convergence between criminal and terrorist networks?

The answer to the research question is that there is a relationship between crime and terrorism – and that this relationship is adapting and evolving. There are four different areas that need to be addressed to discuss the implications of this adapting and evolving threat: a discussion of what the threat will look like; characteristics of a organized crime and terrorist nexus; a discussion of the role of the U.S. military to address this threat; and specific recommendations concerning how to handle this threat.

#### What will this Threat Look Like?

This organization will most likely be a combination of a terrorist and crime organization. Organized crime has a very hierarchical structure; this is probably due to the number of products and services that must be managed as well as the quality of the field force. Since organized crime inherently employs the disenfranchised, petty thieves, or career criminals as described by the Anomie, the Conflict, and Differential Opportunity theories. These groups do not follow or accept the rules and laws of the

society; therefore, middle managers are a necessary commodity in order to operate an efficient field force. A good example of this phenomenon was seen in the cases studies where the Taliban used the tribal leaders to manage the poppy farmers; likewise, the FARC used its militia to provide security to the coca farmers, which was a forced extortion. Both organizations needed to control the crop and the farmer; therefore, both established methods based-on extortion, intimidation as well as coercion, fear, and corruption in this management style.

A terrorist group brings another organizational style to the fold. The larger terrorist groups have two arms; a political and military organization. The military arm has several different structures; however, like organized crime it is hierarchical in structure, but modified (See Appendix D). The types of structures are cell, hierarchical, networked, circular, or flattened. This alteration in structure is achieved through an ideological acceptance of the short and long-term strategy to gain and achieve political power. With a high degree of buy-in, a nexus organization could use a decentralized structure that would have personal incentives to keep the organization on track. These incentives could include cash paid to families in the event of death, franchise opportunities, and good wages.

These organizations would also have a financial networks that receive monies from investments, black market activities, human trafficking, and money laundering; thus, there would some overlap in legitimate businesses. This overlay would allow organized crime and terrorists to send monies to distant groups. Such a large organization will have other services as well – like logistics, security, and technology management personnel to facilitate business operations. These services are necessary to monitor law

enforcement for movement routes, protect computer networks for e-trade, make available secure communications, and provide security to the work force. Security services will provide for the physical safety of syndicate members, the products and services, and the illegal business centers.

### Characteristics of a Nexus

Before determining the degree of a crime and terrorism nexus, one has to understand the sociopolitical environment, the cultural norms, the population, as well as the crime situation in a given country. Consequently, a very detailed analysis must be conducted in order to define the environment to include the social, physical, and economic status. This analysis will help understand the overlay between these organizations. “As transnational security challenges continue to grow in severity around the world, military leaders and planners are facing the almost inevitable reality that armed forces will be deployed against them in the decades ahead.” (Smith 200, 77)

The overlap between these organizations may be a large or moderate overlap. The level of overlap will depend on a variety of factors; however, the best indicator is represented by the activities of organized crime either traditional or transnational. Dejan Anastasijevic wrote in “The Organized Crime in the Western Balkans” there are “three main sectors of organized crime activities – trafficking in drugs, human beings, and weapons – are intertwined, and all three are deeply embedded in the pervasive culture of corruption (Anastasijevic 2007, 13). Thus the difference between an a high or low nexus would depend on (1) the nation-state (2) the amount of resources involved in organized crime and (3) cultural norms. Anastasijevic depicted this concept “The Organized Crime in the Western Balkan” with the three activities overlapping, see Figure 4.




Figure 4. Conceptual Design of in Organized Crime in the Western Balkans  
 Source: Anastasijevic, *Organized Crime in the Western Balkans* (Austria: The HUMSEC Journal, 2007), 1.

A high-level and low-level nexus between crime and terrorist organizations shows the characteristics based-on four case studies, two comparisons, and the literature review.




Figure 5. Characteristics of High-Level Nexus

1. Definition: A higher-level nexus of organized crime and terrorism has the ability to influence the law-making process. Therefore, it is affiliated with legitimate law makers, others in law enforcement and other elements of a country's rule of law. The organization establishes these ties to establish and maintain its interests.
2. Under the high-level nexus, there is a well-developed illegal industry; these are large industries like the drugs, weapons, wildlife or human trafficking. These industries generate multi-billions of dollars around the world and are located in areas that have substantial illegal resources.
3. A high-level nexus has a larger footprint to include trade routes, egress and ingress routes, manning, communication networks, and money laundering methods. This organization overlaps in the legal and illegal sector, especially in the government, legal and business arena. These organizations are well-developed and have a hierarchical management and leadership network. These organizations hide under the cover of legitimate businesses as well as a malleable population to protect the large network.
4. The illegal trade is an accepted business practice in the region; therefore the links to the illegal trade are harder to break as the populace may be reliant on the resource for income.
5. The revenue from the illegal trade will be generated from a well-developed western nation. For example, the Afghanistan poppy primarily earns revenues from Great Britain while Colombian cocaine earns revenues in North America.
6. The insurgency will be rural-based; this will protect the commodity and will allow the insurgency to dominate the population. A rural-based insurgency will also enable the insurgents to conduct military-type training in remote areas.
7. This nexus will have a long-term social and political strategy to gain power while protecting interests in the industry. The illegal industry facilitates the insurgency, so there is a symbiotic relationship.
8. These insurgencies are more militant than their urban counterparts. They will use a combination of unconventional and conventional tactics and they will adapt to the military tactics vice public opinion. Public opinion does not matter in regions like Colombia and Afghanistan as both countries have decentralized population with little ties to the media or the government.
9. These insurgencies have a Marxist or religionist ideology in order to lure fighters from the underprivileged or subjugated groups. A good example is within the FARC, which has a 30 percent female field force which is unusual for a patriarchic society. Another example is the "Mujaheddin established a network of Madrasah as their recruitment vehicle;" these Madrasah were created to teach

large pools of people; thus creating a pool of insurgents (Abuza 2002, paragraph 4).

10. In these insurgencies, the governments have less reach to the rural communities in terms of rule of law. This is due to the harsh climates and geographically-dispersed populations. These insurgencies have created malleable populations through the use of social controls like (1) social engineering: the practice of controlling the schools, religion and the economics, (2) intertwining with the community, and (3) pro and anti-influence methods.

11. The insurgencies are ideological in nature; however, it uses economic disparity and social conditioning to gain support. The goal of the insurgency is government reorganization through a political coup or gaining the leadership of a major party; these organizations want to maintain economic status quo while seizing power.

12. These types of insurgencies have longevity as they have resources. Therefore it can last from 30-40 years like the Colombia with a relatively unpopular following. This phenomenon occurs due to the decentralized nature of the population in remote or rural areas. Consequently, these people are more malleable due to harsh climates, segmented lineage groups, social conditioning and cultural norms.

13. There are weaknesses or natural seams in a high-level nexus organization; these are (a) the overlap between legal and illegal industries, (b) the criminal element within the organization, (c) money laundering networks and (d) the resource itself. These areas can be exploited to gain intelligence or to leverage the organization.

14. "Military tactics include the use of automatic weapons, explosives as well as intelligence-gathering; these organizations have a high-level of organizational discipline and are also extremely violent and are very much feared in their area of operations" (Smith 2000, 77).

15. Effective methods of intelligence collection are investigative analysis, which includes "Network analysis; telephone record analysis; event, commodity, and activity-flow analysis; timeline analysis; visual investigative analysis; bank record analysis; net worth analysis; business record analysis; content analysis; post seizure analysis; case analysis; and conversation analysis" (Peterson 2005, 7). Since a high-level nexus is essentially a large corporation, these methods are focused on gaining intelligence on the business aspects of the organization while identifying the weaknesses or seams.

16. Control the population by controlling access to the illegal industry; similar to serfdom.




Figure 6. Characteristics of Low-level Nexus

1. Definition: A lower-level nexus uses some of the activities of organized crime, but does not have the resources, the monies or an illegal industry, to harness. Criminals are used due to conveyance and availability vice any ideological buy-in.
2. A low-level crime and terrorist nexus “strives to mobilize the people, resolve the peasant question, coordinate the town-countryside struggle, resolve the problem of national minorities and religious sects, and elevate the level of organization and political consciousness” (Mines 2006, paragraph 11). Instability is the goal in these insurgencies; therefore it will create conditions to heighten tensions to include civil war, ethnocentric crisis, genocide, or sectarian violence.
3. A low-level nexus has state and non-state actors for financial and military support. These links are best broken politically and economically through money devaluation, allegiances, diplomacy, or financial leveraging.
4. Low-level insurgencies arise due to “political and socioeconomic factors which are often cited as the main cause for the rise of Maoist or Marxist insurgencies as these groups usually occur in economically deprived areas” (International Institute of Social History 2006).
5. “The resistance fighters have no general strategy, no coordination, no organization other than traditional ties to tribe, region, and family” (Chaliand 1982, 325). The low-level nexus has more foreign fighters with some criminals. The workforce is comprised of the subjugated and the underprivileged elements of a society who conduct the terrorist activities.



6. The resistance has very little political or social programs, and has no vision of the future (Chaliand 1982, 325).
7. Low-level criminal activities include kidnapping, extortion, armed robbery, and selling bootleg DVDs. These activities are done to pay the criminals or an insurgent for emplacing an IED.
8. Crime analysis: Crime pattern analysis, geographic analysis, time-series analysis, frequency-distribution analysis, behavioral analysis, and statistical analysis (Chaliand 1982, 325).
9. Under a low-level nexus, determining future enemy activity is difficult; however, a geometric or statistical approach to problem-solving could be used to predict target sets, locations of bombs, location of IEDs, or kidnappings.
10. Insurgents or terrorists gain population support and population influence through fear coercion, and intimidation.

#### Role for the U.S. Military

Governments around the world are increasingly discovering that civilian agencies which would normally manage these problems--such as police, health, environment, or immigration ministries--simply cannot cope with the magnitude of the problems they are confronting. This trend implies a major change in how countries will likely deploy their armed forces in the decades ahead. More important, however, it suggests a fundamental new role for military forces in the 21st century (Smith 2000, 77).

Because the U.S. Army is technologically superior and logistically wealthier to its current adversaries, adversaries must evolve in order to remain relevant and successful in the COE. To do this, adversaries must use alternative methods to achieve “their definition” of success. Consequently, our military may see the same effect of Anomie, the Conflict, and Differential Opportunity theories where the blockage of societal mobility or legitimate opportunities equates to the blockage of traditional military tactics. An organized or transnational crime and terrorism nexus may be one an alternative methods.

As per NSDD-221, “the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, in conjunction with the Secretary of State, should develop and implement any necessary

modifications to applicable statutes, regulations, procedures, and guidelines to enable U.S. military forces to support counter-narcotics efforts more actively, consistent with the maintenance of force readiness and training” (see Appendix B) (Reagan Administration 1986, 3).

### Understanding the Landscape

Key terrain is defined by FM-2-01.3/MRCP 2-3A as “any locality or area whose seizure, retention, or control affords a marked advantage to either combatant. The researcher believes that organized crime and their activities can provide this marked advantage when one understands the scope and nature of its operation. In order to prepare for a diverse battlefield understanding the convoluted mix of population, organized crime, and commerce is necessary. Intelligence analysis must contain comprehensive population information from many perspectives during Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. These studies should identify seams and gaps in the population, which should include the activities of organized crime - money laundering, prostitution, or the drug trade.

Another characteristic of key terrain is the inhabitants of a particular region; the people can give an enemy a powerful advantage if leveraged for that region. The population, therefore, can be considered key terrain in certain areas; a good example of this phenomenon occurred in Afghanistan when the Taliban took control of the sale and distribution of opium using the tribal leaders to gain total control. The Taliban understood the strength of the tribal leaders and used it to the gain an advantage. Thus, understanding the people and the illegal industry becomes a necessity. In this case, understanding the opium trade to include ingress and egress routes, harvest months, other transnational

criminal groups involved in trading, trade routes to Europe and Russia, and money laundering methods; all will create a powerful advantage.

In an urban environment, key terrain can be such things as tall structures, choke points, intersections, bridges, industrial complexes, or other facilities” (FM 2-01.3). In Algeria the FLN adopted a urban strategy even though it was somewhat risky as it involved “considerable terrorism in urban centers” (O’Neill 2005, 71). However, this method offered the FLN the most control of the populace. Population influence operations are those operations that produce a quelling effect amongst the populace, which enables a terrorist group or a non-state actor to achieve a political objective. Galula stated that “the insurgent’s objective is the population” whether in active or submissive support (Galula 1968, 7). However, many of the insurgents involved in the Algerian War belonged to organized crime syndicates. Thus, understanding where the drug lords operate, the location of the hideouts, or the weapons smuggling activities can give a marked advantage as well.

Like the other examples of key terrain, illegal commerce and organized crime may be new additions; thus analysts must understand the patterns of organized crime. For example, tattoos, branding, and logos are used to facilitate meetings through instant recognition and reduce capture by eliminating the possibility of electronic wiretapping. In order to establish linkages, tattoos and brandings could be used as a passive collection method in the human intelligence process. The tattoos could be used to establish relationships on the association matrix as done by U.S. law enforcement in gang and cartel operations. Good examples of the tattoos used by the Russia Mafia are shown in Appendix C.

Another example of an organized crime tactics is through the use of cell burners. A burner is the street name for a pre-paid cell phone or disposable phone. Burners do not leave an audit trail and the phones can easily be purged. Another method to ensure secure communications is through the use of multiple Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards. SIM cards are used on international cell phones--usually Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) phones that operate in the 900-1800 frequency which is common in Asia, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and India. The SIM cards are interchangeable and one criminal may have several SIM cards (equating to several phone numbers with different service providers) for one GSM phone. Both burner and SIM card can be purchased in a cash transaction while providing little or no information about oneself.

### Analysis and Recommendations

The impact of a well-developed and powerful organized or transnational crime syndicate makes it extremely difficult to stabilize a country while promoting the growth in the government and the economy. Additionally, the host country may or may not have a working police force and no viable police means no law enforcement, rule of law, or a stable environment. The military must also continue its efforts to keep “ears to the ground” through the use of its Civil Affairs and human intelligence to gauge population sentiments. This work has been historically risky and is perhaps even more risky in Colombia, Afghanistan, or Iraq as it allows military personnel, and officials of other U.S. government agencies to establish low-level contacts and develop informants. Such coordinated interagency efforts will prove to be an invaluable part of the military's force protection plan as well as allow the military to exploit these seams and gaps that

criminals afford. Effectively combating crime will be a key element to stabilizing the nations in the future and will require and international effort from organizations like International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the FBI, Iraqi Police Forces (IPF) and coalition forces. To do this, the U.S. military must determine the best investigative methods per operational area; these methods include:

Crime analysis: Crime pattern analysis, geographic analysis, time-series analysis, frequency-distribution analysis, behavioral analysis, and statistical analysis (Peterson 2005, 7).

Investigative (evidential) analysis: Network analysis; telephone record analysis; event, commodity, and activity-flow analysis; timeline analysis; visual investigative analysis; bank record analysis; net worth analysis; business record analysis; content analysis; post seizure analysis; case analysis; and conversation analysis (Peterson 2005, 7).

Strategic analysis: Threat assessments, premonitory, vulnerability assessments, risk assessments, estimates, general assessments, warnings, problem profiles, target profiles, and strategic targeting (Peterson 2005, 7).

My last recommendation is to leverage information more effectively. With the large amounts data generated from in an insurgency, another area that must be considered is turning information into intelligence. In Iraq, Afghanistan and Columbia, analyzing patterns becomes increasingly difficult due to the amount of information and the number of attacks on the battlefield. However, a computer-generated model would take the historical data, remove the noise, and then make predictions on areas that are truly vulnerable. These predictions would be based-on historical information of insurgent groups by location, target, and type of attack. Pilla, Loader, and Taylor found a data reduction method for data sets that contained huge amounts of information; it reduces “the haystacks of information” and makes it manageable and predictable (Pilla, Loader, and Taylor 2005). The researcher believes there is a “need for sophisticated new

statistical method that searches for the unusual activity, or signals among all random background data” (Pilla, Loader, and Taylor 2005). A pictorial example of this phenomenon is at Figure 7, which shows the phases of data reduction. The process starts with voluminous information shown as the first circle. It is then followed by the second circle, which is a data reduction and the third circle, which represents the pattern identification.



Figure 7. Data Reduction Methods

Source: Pilla, Loader, and Taylor, *Detecting a Significant Signal in a Large Amount of Background Noise* (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University, 2005), paragraph 1.

The Pilla, Loader, and Taylor model could identify criminal networks and its activities; however, if the groups have an ideological objective other variables should be added into the analytical criteria. These variables do not differentiate the criminal from the terrorist organizations; however, it adds valuable information to pattern identification. This information in aggregate can differentiate organization using an all-source process or is the “conversion of information into intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all-source data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated user requirements” (FM-2-01.3/MRCP 2-3A).

....winning may not be desirable: the point of war may be precisely the legitimacy, which it confers on actions that in peacetime might be punishable as crimes. Whereas analysts have tended to assume that war is the 'end' and abuse of civilians the “means,” it is important to consider the opposite possibility: that the end is to engage in abuse or crimes that bring immediate rewards, while the means is war and its perpetuation. (Garces 2005, 86)

## APPENDIX A

### ABU GHRAIB WEAPON PHOTOS



Figure 8. Shanks and Electrical Shock Devices

Source: Researcher (Photo, CGSC Student, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 14 April 2005).




Figure 9. Sling Shots and Strangulation Devices

Source: Researcher (Photo, CGSC Student, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 14 April 2005).



## APPENDIX B

### NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 221

The White House  
Washington

April 8, 1986

#### Narcotics and National Security

Purpose: To identify the impact of the international narcotics trade upon U.S. national security, and to direct specific actions to increase the effectiveness of U.S. counter-narcotics efforts to enhance our national security.

Background. The expanding scope of global narcotics trafficking has created a situation which today adds another significant dimension to the law enforcement and public health aspects of this international problem and threatens national security of the United States.

While the domestic effects of drugs are a serious societal problem for the United States and require the continued aggressive pursuit of law enforcement, health care, and demand reduction programs, the national security threat posed by the drug trade is particularly serious outside U.S. borders. Of primary concern are those nations with a flourishing narcotics industry, where a combination trafficking organizations, rural insurgents, and urban terrorists can undermine the stability of the local government; corrupt efforts to curb drug crop production, processing, and distribution; and distort public perception of the narcotics issue in such a way that it becomes part of an anti - U.S. or anti-western debate.

While these problems are endemic to most nations plagued by narcotics, their efforts are particularly insidious for the democratic states of the western hemisphere. Moreover, the expansion of narcotics activity creates a regional, as well as country specific problem.

- The narcotics trade threatens the integrity of democratic governments by corrupting political and judicial institutions. The effect on U.S. interests from such a situation can range from a regime unwilling to unable to cooperate with counter-narcotics programs to a government that is unable to control key areas of its territory and elements of its own judiciary, military, or economy.
- In key drug-producing nations, trafficking organizations have used control of local media to influence public attitudes and impede the ability of local governments to cooperate with U.S. counter-narcotics programs.

- Narcotics activity is inevitably accompanied by rising rate of violence. This includes crimes by and upon those seeking to buy drugs, against innocent bystanders, between competing trafficking networks, and violence against public officials associated with narcotics control, including U.S. personnel.
- In many countries, the same networks used to smuggle drugs are also employed to bring in illegal weapons.
- Some insurgent groups finance their activities through taxing drug activities, providing protection to local criminal traffickers, or growing their own drug crops. Access to money available from narcotics can have a major impact on the capability of the insurgent forces.
- Some terrorist groups have been linked to drug smuggling primarily to finance their activities. The profits from even one consignment of narcotics could provide small terrorist cells with substantial operating capital.
- Several sovereign states have supported or condoned international drug trafficking for financial or political reasons.

Policy. The international drug trade threatens the national security of the United States by potentially destabilizing democratic allies. It is therefore the policy of the United States in cooperation with other nations, to halt the production and flow of illicit narcotics, reduce the ability of insurgent and terrorist groups to use drug trafficking to support their activities, and strengthen the ability of individual government to confront and defeat this threat.

Implementation. To implement this policy, the departments and agencies of the United States should perform the following:

- The Secretary of State and the Administrator of AID should ensure that narcotics control objectives are fully integrated into foreign assistance planning efforts. The planning process should include consideration of programs designed to assist foreign governments achieve effective control objectives and should be guided by the principles of controlling drop production and targeting trafficking at the source and transit.
- The Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, in conjunction with the Secretary of State, should develop and implement any necessary modifications to applicable statutes, regulations, procedures, and guidelines to enable U.S. military forces to support counter-narcotics efforts more actively, consistent with the maintenance of force readiness and training.
- The Vice President and secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, and the Attorney General should strengthen international support for counter-narcotics

initiatives by raising this issue in high-level discussions with counterparts in producer and trafficker nations as appropriate. They should also raise narcotics as an international security issue with U.S. allies.












- The Director of the Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General and other relevant agencies and acting in accordance with E.O. 12333, should enhance, where appropriate, support of the drug enforcement effort targeted against international drug traffickers.
- The Director of the Central Intelligence should ensure that the intelligence community gives special emphasis on all aspects of the international illicit drug trade.
- The Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Director, USIA and the Administrator of AID, should assist in developing drug abuse prevention and education programs with drug producing, transit, and consumer nations.
- The U.S. Chief of Mission should assure the necessary coordination of all assistance, intelligence and the interdiction activities of the U.S. government agencies toward specific countries as a priority responsibility. The Chief of Mission should periodically report his efforts to bring the full range of U.S. resources to bear to engage the cooperation of the producer and transit countries.
- The Secretary of Defense, as Executive Agent for communications Security (in accordance with E.O. 12333 and NSDD-145) and the National Communications Systems (in accordance with E.O. 12472 and NSDD-97), should coordinate with appropriate agencies and departments to ensure that a secure and interoperable interagency telecommunications capability is available for drug-related operations – existing national communications systems (NSC) assets.

The Attorney General, as Chairman of the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, shall submit a report to the President by September 30, 1986 giving the status of plans and accomplishments for all actions directed herein.

Signed Ronald Reagan

## APPENDIX C


### COMMUNICATION VIA TATTOOS

| Name   | Meaning  |
|--|--|
| Tattoos from "Культ Тату" (cont.) <sup>458</sup>   |  |
| 1.                            | 1. "Incorrigible thief"  |
| 2.                            | 2. Bearer was formerly a "thief in law."                                     |
| 3.                            | 3. "Greetings to thieves." Crown signifies the bearer as the head of a gang. |
| 4.                            | 4. "Thief in law."   |
| 5.                            | 5. "A burglar."  |
| 6.                          | 6. "Pickpocket."   |
| 7.                          | 7. "Pickpocket."   |
| 8.                          | 8. "Greetings to thieves." Crown signifies the bearer as the head of a gang. |
| 9.                          | 9. "Greetings to thieves" (Thief in law).                                    |
| 10.                         | 10. The owner considers that he belongs to thieves.                          |
| 11. <br>Placement: Knuckles | 11. "Thief in law."  |

Source: MacCaffrey, Senatorova, and Gagne. *Russian Criminal/Prison Tattoos, Research conducted for the Migration Integrity Unit Immigration Section, Canadian Embassy: Moscow* (2005), 61.

APPENDIX D

TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONAL CATEGORIES



*Source:* Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence - Threats, version 3.0, (2005), 3-5-3-8.

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